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Introduction
Although courts nowadays routinely recite the old saw that the antitrust
laws are intended for "the protection of competition, not competitors,"' the
content of that phrase has not always been clear. The Supreme Court first
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1 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). For a sampling of Supreme
Court cases reiterating this phrase, see Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338
(1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 (1986); Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 762 n.14 (1984); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). Other cases make the same point using different language.
See, e.g., NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998) (noting that a plaintiff "must
allege and prove harm, not just to a single competitor, but to the competitive process, Le., to
competition itself"); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) ("The purpose
of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect
the public from the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is
competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition
itself.").
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announced it in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, which held a merger illegal
because it would enhance efficiency and thus threaten smaller competitors of
the merging firms.2 More recently, however, courts have given the phrase
coherent meaning by linking "competition" to economic efficiency, or con-
sumer welfare.3 For the most part, the modem Supreme Court has endorsed
this goal,4 invoking it in framing the doctrines of attempted monopolization,5
non-price vertical restraints,6 maximum resale price fixing,7 and antitrust
injury.8
While most commentators and the enforcement agencies voice support
for the consumer welfare standard, substantial disagreement exists over when
economic theory justifies a presumption of consumer injury. Virtually all
would subscribe to the theoretical prediction that an effective cartel will
likely inflict consumer injury by reducing output and thus increasing prices.9
But the academic and judicial consensus disappears when the theory at issue
predicts that a practice-a merger or a predatory pricing campaign, for exam-
ple-will harm consumers in the future through some complex sequence of
events.' 0
2 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 345-46. Later in Brown Shoe, the Court repeated that "[i]t is
competition, not competitors, which the Act protects," but added that "we cannot fail to recog-
nize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally
owned businesses." Id at 344.
3 See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 458; Discon, 525 U.S. at 135. See generally ROB-
ERT H. BORK, TiE ANnlusT PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 427 (rev. ed. 1993)
("The argument of this book, of course, is that competition must be understood as the maximiza-
tion of consumer welfare or, if you prefer, economic efficiency."). Professor Robert Lande ar-
gues that antitrust is aimed at preventing wealth transfers from consumers to producers rather
than enhancing "consumer welfare" in the sense of economic efficiency or total social wealth.
The distinction may matter in some cases, but it does not affect our focus on consumer harm.
Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Effi-
ciency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAsTNGs L. 65, 68 (1982).
4 For example, the Court in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332
(1982), declared illegal per se a fee setting arrangement among physicians and insurers that
likely benefited consumers. Id at 348-49; see Jill Boylston Herndon & John E. Lopatka, Man-
aged Care and the Questionable Relevance of Maricopa, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 117 (1999). But
the Court seemed to reason that its decision in fact protected consumers. See Herndon &
Lopatka, at 125.
5 E.g., Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 448.
6 E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37 (1977).
7 E.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997).
8 E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,484 (1977). A private
antitrust plaintiff must prove not only an antitrust violation, but also that she has suffered or is
threatened with the kind of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, and if the defen-
dant's conduct does not injure competition, the plaintiff's loss cannot properly be considered
antitrust injury. Id at 489.
9 But see DONALD DEWEY, THE ANTrIUsT ExPERmENT IN AmERiCA 107-20 (1990) (ar-
guing that collusion may be an efficient response to uncertainty); George Bittlingmayer, De-
creasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & ECON.
201 (1982) (arguing that price fixing may be efficient in some industries).
10 Compare Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling
Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1, 25-34 (1995) (arguing for a
relaxed antitrust injury standard to facilitate private merger challenges), with William H. Page &
John E. Lopatka, Antitrust Injury, Merger Policy, and the Competitor Plaintiff, 82 IowA L. REv.
127, 141-42 (1996) (arguing for current antitrust injury requirement).
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Two recent cases and an article have suggested that certain practices of
dominant firms threaten harm to consumers by inhibiting innovation." This
concern with retarded innovation is not altogether new,12 but it has achieved
a new prominence. In one celebrated case, a district court held that the
Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") illegally preserved a monopoly in the
market for personal computer operating systems by, among other things, sup-
pressing Netscape's Navigator Internet browser and Sun's Java technology.13
The court did not find that Microsoft's monopoly would have vanished
before trial but for Microsoft's exclusionary practices. Rather, it held that
Microsoft's practices delayed the emergence of competing platform technolo-
gies that might eventually have threatened Microsoft's dominance. 14 This
11 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); In re Intel Corp., No.
9288 (FIC filed June 8, 1998). Another case based primarily on the theory of harm to innova-
tion is United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7076, 1999 WL 476437 (S.D.N.Y. July 7,
1999); see also Complaint, United States v. Visa, Inc. (No. 98 CIV. 7076) ("Visa Compl."), availa-
ble at http:llwww.usdoj.govlatr/caseslfl900/l973.htrn. The government alleges that the banks
controlling Visa and MasterCard "restrain[ ] competition in the market for general purpose card
network products and services." Visa Compl. 1. The government asserts that the "anticompe-
titive effects of [the unlawful practices] exceed what can readily be observed because many prod-
ucts, services, and innovations that would have emerged in a competitive environment were
never even considered by" Visa and MasterCard and their managements. Visa Compl. 83. For
another example, the cable television industry's practice of bundling broadband transmission
and Internet services has been attacked because it allegedly threatens to dampen innovation.
John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation,
Speculation, and Cable Bundling, 52 HAsTINGs L.J. 891 (2001) (explaining and rejecting
argument).
12 For example, in United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), the Supreme
Court condemned a merger between a large metal container manufacturer and a large glass
container producer in part because it would lessen incentives for product innovation. Id. at 463,
466. More recently, in 1995, the Justice Department issued antitrust guidelines for intellectual
property licensing that emphasize a concern with competition to innovate. U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TicE, ANTrrRusr GUIDELINES FOR THE LIcENsING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3 (1995).
Additionally, the enforcement agencies have voiced concern about the effects of mergers on
innovation markets. E.g., Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Effi-
ciency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANrrrusT L.J. 569, 586-
87 (1995) (examining FTC and DOJ challenges to mergers based on innovation markets).
13 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30,38-39 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of
law); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of fact). See
generally John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the Law
and Economics of Exclusion, 7 Sup. CT. ECON. Rv. 157 (1999). This Article was written before
the court of appeals issued its decision in Microsoft, affirming some of the liability determina-
tions, reversing others and the remedial order, and remanding the case. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam). The decision does not
change our analysis, though we would have liked to incorporate it in our discussion. We do note
in two places in the Article that the decision affects prior statements by the appellate court, see
infra notes 54 and 224, but we cannot address the differences in detail because of production
constraints.
14 The district court in Microsoft found:
The actions that Microsoft took against Navigator hobbled a form of innovation
that had shown the potential to depress the applications barrier to entry sufficiently
to enable other firms to compete effectively against Microsoft in the market for
Intel-compatible PC operating systems. That competition would have conduced to
consumer choice and nurtured innovation .... Microsoft has retarded, and perhaps
2001]
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consumer harm was primarily prospective and contingent on the effect of
Microsoft's conduct on future innovation.
In the other case, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") charged that
Intel used the intellectual property rights in its dominant microprocessors to
thwart the development of competing products. 5 By threatening to withhold
intellectual property rights in its products, Intel allegedly induced several of
its customers to surrender rights to their innovations by granting Intel roy-
alty-free licenses. Because firms dependent on Intel could not count on reap-
ing the rewards of their innovation, their incentives to innovate allegedly
declined. The result was a reduction in "competition to develop new
microprocessor technology and future generations of microprocessor
products.' 6
The core idea behind these cases bears a family resemblance to an argu-
ment advanced in a recent article. Jonathan Baker, a former director of the
FTC's Bureau of Economics, has proposed that certain conduct by dominant
firms is so likely to deter innovation that it should be held unlawful even
without a showing of immediate harm to competition. 17 Specifically, he has
suggested that "a firm with monopoly power violates Sherman Act § 2 if it
excludes rivals from the monopolized market by restricting a complementary
or collaborative relationship without an adequate business justification.' ' 8
This "truncated" rule, which he derives from the Supreme Court's decisions
in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.'9 and Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. ,20 obviates the need for the plaintiff to
prove harm to competition; it may even preclude the defendant from offering
evidence that competition was not harmed. 21 Instead, Baker would infer
competitive injury in the specified circumstances "from the absence of a valid
and sufficient business justification. '22 Baker argues that when the condi-
tions of his rule are satisfied, harm to competition-in the form of a reduced
incentive to innovate-usually will result; yet it will be difficult to prove.23
Harm to innovation poses a challenge for antitrust law. Antitrust viola-
tions typically involve immediate competitive injury in the form of lower out-
altogether extinguished, the process by which these two middleware technologies
could have facilitated the introduction of competition into an important market.
Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 103.
15 In re Intel Corp., No. 9288 (FTC filed June 8, 1998).
16 Id. 39.
17 Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule,
7 GEo. MASON L. REV. 495 (1999).
18 Id. at 496 (footnote omitted).
'9 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
20 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
21 Baker, supra note 17, at 517. Baker would certainly eliminate the requirement in the
circumstances described that a plaintiff establish competitive injury as part of its case in chief.
But it is not clear whether he would permit the defendant to rebut the case by proving lack of
competitive harm. It appears that he would preclude the defendant from avoiding liability by
establishing a lack of competitive harm. For example, he says that his "truncated analy-
sis ... does not consider harm to buyers," suggesting that the defendant may not contest the
issue. Id.
22 Id. at 502.
23 Id. at 517.
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put and higher prices.24 In cases alleging harm to innovation, such as
Microsoft and Intel, an adverse price effect sometimes is predicted, but the
principal claim is often that better products would have replaced or at least
competed with the monopolist's product. Though the consumer injury asso-
ciated with these effects is an appropriate antitrust concern, it is speculative
to a degree not found in traditional antitrust cases.25 As one commentator
has noted, "R&D competition is more complicated than price competition,
and the incentives, path of progress, and outcomes are much harder to pre-
dict."'26 A finding of harm to innovation requires, first, a counterfactual in-
ference that innovators would have invented new products but for the
predatory conduct and, second, that those products would have been better
or cheaper than others in the market.27
There is reason to be skeptical of the claim of harm to innovation. Eco-
nomics offers no clear guidance on the conditions and conduct that result in
optimal innovation, and thus, theories predicting innovative harm tend not to
be robust.28 Moreover, the claim usually is made in dynamic and innovative
markets.29 A complaint that, absent exclusionary conduct, innovation would
have been faster and better is easy to make but difficult either to prove or
disprove. If it is accepted too readily, the scope of potential antitrust liability
expands beyond appropriate limits. A loser in a dynamic market is apt to
assert that the defendant's conduct thwarted the introduction of a product
that was just around the corner. The danger is that antitrust will once again
protect competitors at the expense of consumers, even as it purports to ad-
vance consumer welfare.3 0
Resting antitrust liability on a prediction of future adverse consequences
is particularly dangerous when the allegedly exclusionary behavior provides
immediate consumer benefits. The Supreme Court has insisted on detailed
support for predatory pricing claims largely because a finding of predatory
pricing trades the present consumer benefit of very low prices for the possi-
bility of avoiding higher prices in the future. 31 The same tradeoff can arise in
24 See, e.g., DAVID S. EvANs & RIcHARD SCHMALENSEE, SoME ECONoMIc ASPECTS OF
ANTTRUST ANALYSIS IN DYNAMICALLY COMPETrIvE INDuSTRIES 16 (2001) (NERA working
paper, on file with authors) (noting that "antitrust analysis has historically taken departures from
the textbook perfect competition as signs of possible competitive problems that may warrant
government intervention").
25 Andrew Chin, Analyzing Mergers in Innovation Markets, 38 JuRwMnTmcs J. 119, 120
(1998) (describing uncertainties in antitrust treatment of innovation markets).
26 Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger
Analysis, 64 ArrrrusT L.J. 19, 45 (1995).
27 Chin, supra note 25, at 124.
28 As Frederick Warren-Boulton testified on behalf of the government in Microsoft,
"[t]here is nothing in economic theory that says if an industry is monopolized, the rate of techno-
logical change will either speed up or slow down." Transcript of Nov. 19, 1998, 1998 WL 803825,
at *14, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 AirmusT L.J. 925, 939 (2001) (noting that "economic
theory and empirical evidence have yet to generate a consensus on whether monopoly is on
balance good or bad for innovation").
29 See, e.g., EvANs & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 24, at 2.
30 See supra note 2.
31 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986).
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cases in which the threat to competition stems from efficient integration.
Merger analysis, for example, must weigh present benefits of a merger
against the possibility that it will foster noncompetitive pricing in the future.32
Even if a practice confers no immediate and discernable benefits,
prohibiting it in hopes of promoting future innovation is problematic if the
kind of practice at issue usually increases consumer welfare. Antitrust law
has long resisted imposing liability for certain categories of practices, such as
the unilateral choice of trading partners, that are essential to the normal
functioning of markets.3 3 Because anticompetitive instances of this kind of
practice are so rare, the threat of liability can inhibit value-enhancing trans-
actions. Therefore, even if termination of a business relationship appears ar-
bitrary, the law should impose liability for the action only with extreme
caution.
In our view, the desire to protect innovation is legitimate, but its specific
applications in the Microsoft and Intel cases and Baker's proposal jeopardize
consumer interests. The courts and Baker use the notion of harm to innova-
tion to shift the burden to the defendant to justify conduct that harms a com-
petitor. But to relax the antitrust plaintiff's obligation to prove harm to
competition, particularly when the conduct provides immediate consumer
benefits, is unwarranted. A business justification defense does not provide
dominant firms the breathing space they need to pursue legitimate objectives
in a rough-and-tumble marketplace.
In the next Part, we describe the analytical framework that the Supreme
Court has employed to evaluate claims of anticompetitive effects. The Court,
in essence, assesses the likelihood of anticompetitive effects by a theoretical
analysis of the practice's facial characteristics. Based on that assessment, the
Court allocates the parties' evidentiary burdens. Where a practice, on its
face, is virtually certain to harm competition, the Court declares it either pre-
sumptively or per se illegal. But if an anticompetitive effect is less certain,
particularly where the practice provides immediate consumer benefits, the
Court will insist that the plaintiff provide correspondingly convincing proof
that the practice in fact reduces consumer welfare. This approach is evident
in the Court's recent monopolization cases, particularly Matsushita,34 Brooke
Group,35 Discon,36 and Spectrum Sports.37 Finally, we show that Aspen and
Kodak are consistent with this approach.
We then turn to the practices that are alleged to threaten innovation. In
Part II, we argue that the plaintiff in an actual or attempted monopolization
case based on a prediction of distant consumer injury must articulate a credi-
ble theory of specific harm and support it with some evidence. The defen-
dant, in turn, is free to dispute that claim. In addition, a finding that the
32 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1997);
MALCOLM B. COATE & A.E. RODRIGUEZ, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MERGERS 2 (1997).
33 See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
34 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986).
35 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219-227
(1993).
36 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998).
37 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
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defendant's conduct produced immediate and significant consumer benefits
should create a presumption in favor of the defendant. In that event, the
plaintiff must lose unless it can prove by compelling evidence that the ex-
pected cost of future consumer harm exceeds the immediate benefits. We
argue, using Microsoft and Intel as examples, that our approach best accom-
modates the important interests at stake.
I. Identifying Harm to Competition
Antitrust law has always distinguished practices based upon the quality
and quantity of evidence a plaintiff must produce to prove the practice is
anticompetitive in a particular case. Historically, the Supreme Court as-
signed practices either to the per se rule, under which courts could condemn
practices "without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use, '38 or to the rule of reason, under which
courts could only condemn a practice after examination of "the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable," in addition to any business justifications. 39 For a time, the Court
appeared to recognize an intermediate, "quick look" variant of rule of reason
analysis.40 Today, however, the Court endorses a sliding scale inquiry in
which the intensity of empirical scrutiny depends upon a facial analysis of the
"obviousness" of the practice's effect on efficiency.41 The primary indicium
of obvious harm is immediate injury to consumers. As we show below, the
Court has used this approach in all kinds of antitrust cases, including those
involving exclusionary practices.
A. The Sliding Scale and Consumer Harm
Recently, in California Dental, the Court wrote:
[T]here is generally no categorical line to be drawn between re-
straints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticom-
petitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What
is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the
circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint. The object is to see
whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessa-
rily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency
of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in
place of a more sedulous one. And of course what we see may vary
38 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
39 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
40 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 & n.39 (1984) ("[The
rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye." (internal quotations
omitted)).
41 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999) ("[O]ur categories of analysis of
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason'
tend to make them appear.").
2001]
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over time, if rule-of-reason analyses in case after case reach identi-
cal conclusions. 42
The facial assessment depends upon the relative plausibility of the competing
stories offered by the parties in light of the knowledge of market mechanisms
the Court has accumulated over the years.43 In California Dental, for exam-
ple, the Court concluded that the procompetitive justifications offered by a
dental association for its ban on certain types of advertising were sufficiently
plausible to avoid condemnation under a relatively truncated "quick look"
inquiry.44 In Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., in contrast, the Court con-
cluded that a trade association's ban on free credit was per se unlawful be-
cause of its obvious effects on price, regardless of any compensating forms of
competition that might occur.45
Antitrust litigation thus typically involves an essentially theoretical facial
evaluation of a practice based on its known characteristics at the summary
judgment stage and a subsequent empirical evaluation during the trial. The
initial evaluation is in many ways the more critical one. It may all but end the
inquiry if the practice is found virtually certain to be either procompetitive,
as in BMI,46 or anticompetitive, as in Catalano. But even if the inquiry con-
tinues, the facial assessment shapes it by identifying the crucial issues and the
applicable standards of proof. The bifurcated analysis mitigates the uncer-
tainty in antitrust cases and the costs of erroneous determinations of liability.
California Dental means that when the Court is most confident that conduct
harms consumers, it is willing to truncate the analysis; when it is most confi-
dent that aspects of the conduct benefit consumers, it is more circumspect.
In cases from the 1960s and earlier, the Supreme Court saw obvious an-
ticompetitive effects where most economists would see none today.47 With
42 Id. at 780-81.
43 For an argument presaging the California Dental approach, see John E. Lopatka, Anti-
trust and Professional Rules: A Framework for Analysis, 28 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 301, 379-81
(1991). See also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)
("BMr') (holding that application of a per se rule depends upon "whether the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output... or instead one designed to 'increase economic efficiency and render markets more,
rather than less, competitive."' (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441
n.16 (1978))). When a particular concerted activity entails an obvious risk of anticompetitive
impact with no apparent potentially redeeming value, the fact that a practice may turn out to be
harmless in a particular set of circumstances will not prevent its being declared unlawful per se.
See BMI at 17 & n.27. But in BMI, the court ruled out application of the per se rule against
price-fixing because of a joint venture's facially obvious cost savings. Id. at 21-23.
44 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 760, 764-65. The Court stated that "the plausibility of compet-
ing claims about the effects of the professional advertising restrictions rules out the indulgently
abbreviated review to which the Commission's order was treated. The obvious anticompetitive
effect that triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown." Id. at 778.
45 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980).
46 Although the Court held only that the per se rule did not apply to the blanket license,
the court of appeals upheld the license under the rule of reason on virtually identical reasoning.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1980).
47 E.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (observing that
vertical territorial restraints "are so obviously destructive of competition that their mere exis-
tence is enough"); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400 (1911)
("That these [resale price maintenance] agreements restrain trade is obvious.").
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the judicial acceptance of the Chicago School's models of practices (and the
associated empirical estimates of the prevalence and costs associated with
those practices),48 the courts are less likely to find obvious anticompetitive
effects when practices merely harm competitors or franchisees. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has broadly characterized as implausible some competitors'
stories of anticompetitive effect, particularly those involving predatory
pricing.
4 9
The Court, however, evidently gives substantial weight to concrete indi-
cia of consumer harm (or benefit) in evaluating stories of anticompetitive
effect.50 Theories vary in the immediacy of their predicted effects and the
relevance of those effects to antitrust concerns. For example, standard the-
ory predicts that cartels and mergers to monopoly will result in immediate
harm to consumers.51 On the other hand, the Court discounts predatory pric-
ing stories in part because many models predict that the relevant harms are in
the future; in the short run, the practice benefits consumers by reducing
prices.52 Because antitrust is all about consumer benefit, a court has every
reason to discount stories that ask it to trade an immediate benefit for a
larger future one. As Judge (now Justice) Breyer stated, in rejecting the as-
sertion that pricing above average total cost could be predatory:
[A] price cut that ends up with a price exceeding total cost-in all
likelihood a cut made by a firm with market power-is almost cer-
tainly moving price in the "right" direction (towards the level that
would be set in a competitive marketplace). The antitrust laws very
rarely reject such beneficial "birds in hand" for the sake of more
speculative (future low-price) "birds in the bush." To do so opens
the door to similar speculative claims that might seek to legitimate
even the most settled unlawful practices.5 3
Moreover, theories vary in the ease and accuracy with which courts can
determine whether their conditions are satisfied. Courts have also accepted
their own limitations in resolving certain types of factual issues. 54 This
48 See generally, William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989).
49 E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595 (1986). The
Court has stated that "economic realities tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deter-
ring: unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, failed predatory pricing schemes
are costly to the conspirators." Id. at 595.
50 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) ("[W]e find it difficult to maintain that
vertically imposed maximum prices could harm consumers or competition to the extent neces-
sary to justify their per se invalidation." (emphasis omitted)).
51 See, ag., William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 2151, 2155-56 (1990).
52 Id. at 2157-58.
53 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983).
54 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("In antitrust law,
from which this whole proceeding springs, the courts have recognized the limits of their institu-
tional competence and have on that ground rejected theories of 'technological tying."'). In its
subsequent decision, the court expressed a greater willingness to investigate the effects of tech-
nological tying, see United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc),
though it continued to endorse a general "[j]udicial deference to product design changes." Id. at
65.
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awareness of their relative institutional competence has, in turn, shaped the
sorts of empirical inquiries the courts set for themselves.
At the same time, the Court has recognized that allowing any sort of
inquiry involves the danger of overdeterrence. Because the purpose of anti-
trust law is to promote consumer welfare,55 the Court is particularly wary of
condemning procompetitive behavior. This concern is acute when the as-
serted anticompetitive practice is facially similar to or associated with a
widely prevalent procompetitive practice, such as a unilateral decision to
switch suppliers or to charge low prices.56 In general, condemnation of
procompetitive practices is an important concern when judging any alleged
abusive single-firm behavior because practices by a single firm often injure
competitors while benefiting consumers. For example, stories of predatory
innovation have made little headway because of the fear of inhibiting
procompetitive conduct. But the Court also wants to avoid using antitrust
liability to deter conduct that, though not procompetitive, is not anticompeti-
tive. To that extent, the Court is not only promoting an antitrust objective,
but respecting values embodied in other laws. Even when the practice may
violate other laws, the Court is attempting to ensure that the costly machin-
ery of antitrust liability and remedies is not used to promote unrelated
interests.57
B. Nonprice Exclusion
The Court's analysis in cases alleging exclusionary conduct is fully con-
sistent with the sliding scale approach outlined above, including the premise
that injury to consumers is the best indicium of harm to competition. Most
obviously, the predatory pricing cases insist that harm to competitors be
sharply distinguished from harm to consumers.58 Nevertheless, some have
suggested that the Court's more recent cases reflect a different, more lenient
"post-Chicago" approach to the requirement of competitive harm.59 Profes-
sor Baker has argued that Aspen and Kodak in particular state a rule that "a
firm with monopoly power violates Sherman Act § 2 if it excludes rivals from
the monopolized market by restricting a complementary or collaborative re-
lationship without an adequate business justification. '60
Certainly, Aspen and Kodak suggest that the Court is willing to allow
juries to find anticompetitive effects in some instances in which a straightfor-
55 See supra note 3.
56 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (finding per se illegality inap-
propriate because "[t]he freedom to switch suppliers lies close to the heart of the competitive
process that the antitrust laws seek to encourage").
57 See id. at 136-37.
58 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) ("That below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is of ne moment to the
antitrust laws if competition is not injured.").
59 Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective,
62 ANTrrRUST L.J. 585, 585-86 (1994); Robert H. Lande, Beyond Chicago: Will Activist Antitrust
Arise Again?, 39 ANTrIRusr BULL. 1, 1-2 (1994); Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the
Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANIRusT
L.J. 193, 197-98 (1993).
60 Baker, supra note 17, at 496.
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ward Chicago analysis would find them unlikely. Nevertheless, the cases do
not shift the primary focus away from injury to consumers as the primary
indicium of competitive harm. They do not support Professor Baker's sug-
gested rule, which would bypass the competitive harm requirement. The sug-
gested rule ignores the Supreme Court's endorsement, most recently in
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,61 and Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan,62 of
a right to terminate business relationships, a right that should only be quali-
fied in narrow circumstances. Equally important, the proposed rule rests on
misreadings of Aspen and Kodak.
1. Discon and Spectrum Sports
The Court has been at some pains since Colgate63 to emphasize that the
right of a firm acting independently to refuse to deal, even when arbitrarily
exercised to harm trading partners, is essential to competition. In Discon, for
example, the Court very recently refused to apply per se analysis to a large
purchaser's decision to switch suppliers allegedly in a scheme to evade rate
regulation, reasoning that "[t]he freedom to switch suppliers lies close to the
heart of the competitive process that the antitrust laws seek to encourage."
64
Discon provided equipment removal services to New York Telephone Com-
pany.65 The phone company's purchasing agent decided to switch to a com-
peting supplier of removal services, allegedly because Discon would not
participate in a scheme to increase rates by defrauding state regulators.
66
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit"),
using an approach consistent with Professor Baker's truncated rule, held that
this conduct could be per se illegal if the defendants failed to establish a
procompetitive justification.67 Like Baker, the Second Circuit would have
allowed the inference of anticompetitive effect from the termination of a ver-
tical relationship, so long as the defendant could not offer an efficiency ratio-
nale for the action.68 The Supreme Court rejected this approach, however,
concluding that terminating Discon was not illegal per se under section 1, and
it remanded a section 269 claim for further consideration in light of its conclu-
sion that the conduct had to be evaluated under the rule of reason.70 The
61 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 130 (1998).
62 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 450, 453-54 (1993).
63 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
64 Discon, 525 U.S. at 137.
65 Id. at 131.
66 Id at 131-32.
67 Id. at 132-33.
63 Id. at 132. It is irrelevant to the point at issue that the plaintiff alleged that a group of
affiliated firms, rather than an individual firm, made the decision to stop buying from the plain-
tiff; the decision to terminate is unilateral in the sense that the plaintiff did not agree to the
termination.
69 The references are to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
70 On remand, the court of appeals itself remanded to the district court for further pro-
ceedings under a rule of reason analysis. Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 184 F.3d 111, 114 (2d
Cir. 1999). The district court then granted summary judgment to NYNEX on the grounds that
Discon had failed to define product and geographic markets or to show harm to competition.
Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 86 F. Supp. 2d 154, 159-65 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Court required the plaintiff to "allege and prove harm, not just to a single
competitor, but to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself."'71
Proof of its own injury coupled with the defendant's inability to establish a
justification was not enough.
It did not matter that the defendants' conduct allegedly hurt consumers
by raising telephone service rates.72 Any consumer injury of this type would
have flowed from regulatory fraud perpetrated by a lawful monopolist, not
from a lessening of competition in the removal services market.73 The harm,
therefore, was not the kind of consumer injury the antitrust laws were in-
tended to prevent. It did not matter that New York Telephone was the larg-
est buyer of removal services in New York state and that Discon had only
one competitor for New York Telephone's business. It did not matter that
the challenged decision was allegedly made for the illicit purpose of circum-
venting regulation.74 Practices that injure a firm but not the competitive pro-
cess itself, such as decisions born of "nepotism or personal pique,"75 may
violate some laws, but not the antitrust laws.76 Even in these circumstances, a
"simple allegation of harm to Discon does not automatically show injury to
competition. '77
The category of practices that presumptively cause competitive injury is
narrow. If such a practice is subject to the stringent form of the per se rule,
the defendant is liable without more; if it is subject to a milder form, the
defendant may escape liability by establishing a justification. But the only
practices the Court now considers per se illegal under either version of the
rule are horizontal price-fixing, vertical minimum price-fixing, horizontal
market divisions, and some horizontal group boycotts. 78 Notably absent from
the list is a monopolist's termination of a complementary relationship with a
competitor; indeed, such a termination involves the freedom to choose busi-
ness partners the Court sought to protect in Discon.79
Similarly, in Spectrum Sports the Court refused to find attempted mo-
nopolization without a showing that the defendants' economic power in a
relevant market raised a dangerous probability of monopolization. 0 The
kind of vertical transactions involved, terminating the plaintiffs' distributor-
ship, cutting off their supply of a patented input, and launching a version of
their product,' do not ordinarily have anticompetitive consequences, even if
in this case they may have been unfair or predatory.82 Harm to competition
71 Discon, 525 U.S. at 135.
72 Id. at 136.
73 Id. at 136-37.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. (citing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225
(1993) ("Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, with-
out more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.")).
77 Id. at 139.
78 Id. at 133-34.
79 See id. at 137.
80 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
81 Id. at 450-51.
82 Id. at 457.
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cannot be inferred solely from evidence that the would-be monopolist in-
jured a rival or even intended to monopolize a market, no matter how unfair
or predatory the conduct.8 3 The Court emphasized that inferences of com-
petitive harm are especially inappropriate in section 2 cases because con-
certed activity covered by section 1 "'inherently is fraught with
anticompetitive risk,"' but single-firm activity is unlike that.84
2. Aspen and Kodak
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the Court continues to insist
on proof of harm to competition, not merely competitors, in its nonprice ex-
clusion cases. Aspen and Kodak are consistent with this approach. In Aspen,
Aspen Skiing Co. ("Ski Co."), which owned three of the four skiing moun-
tains in Aspen, had for several years jointly offered an all-Aspen ticket with
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. ("Highlands"), the owner of the fourth moun-
tain.85 The companies split the revenues based on purchasers' usage of the
facilities. 86 This arrangement collapsed after Ski Co. demanded that High-
lands accept a lower percentage.87 When Highlands' share of skiers in Aspen
declined, it sued, claiming that Ski Co.'s refusal to participate in the pass
constituted monopolization.88 The Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict that
Ski Co. had monopolized the market for "'[downhill] skiing at destination ski
resorts' [in] the 'Aspen area."' 8 9
Professor Baker concludes that the Aspen "Court did not consider effect
on competition in determining whether the monopolization offense could be
found. Harm to competition was effectively inferred ... from the absence of
a valid and sufficient business justification." 90 Although the Court did not
require statistical evidence of a market-wide reduction in output, it explicitly
inferred harm to competition from the evident effect of Ski Co.'s conduct on
consumers9 and, in the specific circumstances of the case, the effect of Ski
Co.'s conduct on Highlands. 92 Ski Co.'s failure to offer a plausible business
justification became fatal only because Highlands had otherwise established a
prima facie case of anticompetitive harm.
Ski Co. did not challenge the jury's finding that it held a dominant
share in a relevant market,93 with only one rival and no threat of new
83 Id. at 459.
84 Id. (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69
(1984)).
85 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 589-90 (1985).
86 Id. at 590-91.
87 Id. at 592-93.
88 Id. at 595.
89 Id. at 596 n.20 (quoting jury findings) (second alteration added).
90 Baker, supra note 17, at 502.
91 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605-07 ("It is relevant to consider [the challenged conduct's] impact
on consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way.").
92 Id. at 607-08.
93 Id. at 596. The defendant, however, had contested the issue below. Id. at 600 n.26 ("In
[the district court], Ski Co. primarily questioned whether the evidence supported a finding that it
possessed monopoly power in a properly defined market.").
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entry. 94 The Court found ample evidence that Ski Co.'s conduct injured
Highlands, 95 and it concluded that Ski Co. failed "to offer any efficiency justi-
fication whatever. '96 These findings by themselves would not have justified
an inference of harm to consumers. If skiers had been indifferent among
skiing locations in Aspen, for example, the elimination of the four-area ticket
would only have rearranged market shares, with no harm to skiers. The
Court found, however, that additional "evidence supports a conclusion that
consumers were adversely affected by the elimination of the 4-area ticket." 97
The Court relied on extensive testimony98 and common sense99 to conclude
that a substantial percentage of Aspen skiers valued diversity among moun-
tains. For a given price, including the transaction cost of obtaining access to
the slopes, these skiers preferred the opportunity to choose among four
mountains in a six-day period to the opportunity to choose among three or
fewer mountains. m00 The popularity of the all-Aspen ticket when offered in
competition with Ski Co.'s three-area ticket implies that many consumers
were willing to pay whatever incremental cost was incurred by the suppliers
in collaborating on a joint ticket, for the price of the joint ticket presumably
reflected its full costs. The elimination of the joint ticket injured the skiers
who preferred the ticket without producing an offsetting benefit to those who
did not.10 1 Perhaps the Court should have required a showing that total out-
put declined, 10 2 but it undeniably examined other evidence of consumer
harm.
94 Id. at 588 ("The development of any major additional facilities is hindered by practical
considerations and regulatory obstacles.").
95 Id. at 607.
96 Id. at 608, 609-10. The Court rejected all of the explanations offered by Ski Co. because
the proffered explanations were undercut by the evidence. Id. at 610.
97 Id. at 606.
98 The Court alluded to testimony of the following: a marketing expert, id. at 606 n.34; the
owner of a condominium management company, id; a wholesale tour operator, id. at 606-07; and
the marketing director of Highlands' ski school, id. at 607 n.36. It also referred to a consumer
survey. Id. at 606. The Court noted that the all-Aspen ticket accounted for nearly thirty-five
percent of the total market. Id. at 591.
99 Id. at 605 (noting that "[m]ost experienced skiers quite logically prefer to purchase their
tickets at once for the whole period that they will spend at the resort").
10o Id. at 605-06.
101 Frank Easterbrook argues that competitive injury cannot be inferred from the fact that
some buyers preferred the all-Aspen ticket because product changes will injure some consumers
even when the changes are driven by competition. See Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying
Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 972, 974 (1986). There is no indication, how-
ever, that the cost of the all-Aspen ticket was subsidized by the sale of other tickets or that the
joint ticket was unprofitable, and those who did not want such a ticket were never forced to buy
one. This was not, therefore, the typical marketing change that pleased some consumers and
disappointed others. Nor was it a wholly unpopular change that was nevertheless necessary
because the old order could not profitably be sustained. If the apparent consumer injury here
were ignored for antitrust purposes, the reason would have to be that, given the size of the
market, the injury suffered by one-third of the skiers, those who preferred a multi-area ticket, is
just not large enough to matter.
102 See, e.g., id. at 974 (criticizing the Court for not looking for empirical signs of exclusion,
including a change in output).
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Ski Co.'s abandonment of the four-area ticket may have increased the
demand for its own three-area ticket,103 an imperfect substitute, more than
the abandonment increased the demand for Highlands' single-area ticket,
which is an even less perfect substitute. Although Ski Co.'s net returns might
have declined after taking account of lost revenues from the all-Aspen pass,
Highlands' net returns might have declined by an even greater proportion.
And overall output might have declined. Of course, such an outcome leaves
money on the table: cooperation would have increased total producer sur-
plus, so both firms could have profited by participating in some sort of joint
ticket. But strategic bargaining might have thwarted the deal.104 The fact
that Ski Co. only refused to participate on the terms insisted upon by High-
lands may suggest that the parties deadlocked in their efforts to divide the
cooperative surplus.105 In the process, consumers lost the surplus value that
had been generated by the all-Aspen pass. If this reading of the facts is cor-
rect, Ski Co. rationally (but unsuccessfully) tried to induce Highlands to ca-
pitulate and participate in a joint ticket for a smaller share of the revenue
than it had accepted historically 0 6
Alternatively, the Court may have interpreted the defendant's conduct
as profitably raising the costs of a rival in circumstances where consumers
were bound to suffer. 0 7 The monopolist's termination of an efficient ar-
rangement increased the costs of the monopolist's only existing or potential
rival, benefiting the monopolist, but hurting consumers.
Whatever one may say about the Court's analysis, which we find uncon-
vincing, the Court did not infer competitive injury solely from a monopolist's
termination of a complementary relationship with a competitor without a
103 The Court noted that Ski Co.'s president believed that "the 4-area ticket was siphoning
off revenues that could be recaptured by Ski Co. if the ticket was discontinued." Aspen, 472 U.S.
at 592.
104 Unless Ski Co. intended to drive Highlands from the market, which is unlikely given the
durable nature of a mountain, one might speculate that the two firms eventually would have
struck a bargain to resume the ticket had the antitrust action not succeeded.
105 The Court referred to anecdotal evidence that a Ski Co. director had advocated to the
board that Ski Co. make an offer that Highlands "could not accept." Id. at 592. That cuts
against the suggestion that Ski Co. wanted to continue the joint ticket, but on more advanta-
geous terms. It is hard to know, however, how much weight to place on the evidence.
106 An unfortunate implication of this reading is that the antitrust laws require a monopo-
list to capitulate to the demands of a rival in dividing the surplus from cooperating to produce a
valuable product, at least where the monopolist had accepted those demands before and cooper-
ation is necessary for the provision of that product.
107 If this was Ski Co.'s strategy, the Court misperceived the nature of the benefit Ski Co.
anticipated. The Court believed that Ski Co. itself was injured by the elimination of the all-
Aspen ticket, but that "it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in
exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival." Id. at 610-11. But if the strategy
effectively raised its rival's costs more than its own costs, Ski Co. could profit immediately. See
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 251 (1986). Given the reduced demand for the
product Highlands could offer absent Ski Co.'s cooperation, Highlands conceivably could have
been driven out of business, and this indeed would have further increased Ski Co.'s profits. A
long-run benefit for Ski Co., therefore, was also possible, if unlikely. But its prospect was not
essential to the theoretical rationality of an anticompetitive strategy based on raising rivals'
costs.
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business justification.10 8 The exclusionary capacity of the failure to cooperate
was self-evident, given the market defined: in this peculiar market a signifi-
cant injury inflicted on one rival by inefficient conduct was almost certain to
hurt consumers, and no credible efficiency enhancing explanation was of-
fered. Professor Baker suggests that the Court used evidence of consumer
harm only to show that the defendant lacked an adequate business justifica-
tion. 0 9 But the Court never expressed any such limitation, and the structure
of the opinion is inconsistent with Baker's interpretation: the Court ad-
dressed the evidence of consumer harm in a section separate from its discus-
sion of business justification. 110
Baker contends that the Court was not inferring competitive injury from
market structure because "the Court never makes this observation.""' But
the Court did cite evidence showing the structure of the market,112 and the
best interpretation of the opinion is that the Court was writing with that
structure in mind. We see no need for the Court to state the obvious proposi-
tion that harm to the only actual or potential competitor in the market had
implications for consumers that would not have existed had the defendant
injured only one of many rivals.113 Stated otherwise, the Court reasoned that
108 We do not mean to imply that an anticompetitive explanation was the only one possible
or even that it was the most convincing. If, for example, the demand for the all-Aspen ticket was
a function of promotional investments made disproportionately by Ski Co., Highlands would
have been free riding on Ski Co.'s efforts. See Easterbrook, supra note 101, at 975-76. The
reduced revenue split offered by Ski Co. as a condition of continuing in the joint arrangement
might have represented compensation for its promotional investments. Id. Thus, Ski Co. ulti-
mately offered to continue the arrangement in 1978-79 if Highlands agreed to accept a 12.5%
share of the revenue, though Highlands' share of visits by skiers using the all-Aspen ticket
ranged from 18.5% to 13.2% during the four previous years for which usage statistics were avail-
able. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 590, 592. In that event, the termination of the ticket would have re-
flected the refusal of Highlands to pay the economic cost of creating the demand for its product
and the refusal of Ski Co. to absorb that cost any longer. See Easterbrook, supra note 101, at
975-76. But Ski Co. did not make this argument. What is important is that an anticompetitive
explanation was plausible, and even though the Court was not clear as to what precise explana-
tion it had in mind, the Court discerned an injury to competition from much more than Ski Co.'s
failure to offer a persuasive business justification.
109 Baker, supra note 17, at 503.
110 The Court cited a passage of the Areeda and Turner treatise that Baker insists is con-
cerned only with business justification, even though the passage attempts to explain the nature of
exclusionary conduct. See id. at 503 n.34. On its face, the passage does not support the assertion
that harm to consumers relates exclusively to business justification, but in any case the Court is
hardly placing heavy reliance on the cited work.
111 Id. at 502 n.33.
112 See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
113 Baker's last argument is that the Court, in Kodak, read Aspen "not to require proof of
an effect on competition." Baker, supra note 17, at 503. But the Kodak Court cites Aspen for
the proposition that, once the plaintiffs "presented evidence that Kodak took exclusionary action
to maintain" one monopoly and strengthen another, "[l]iability turns, then, on whether 'valid
business reasons' can explain Kodak's actions." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) (emphasis added). Baker reads this as establishing that once it is
proven that a monopolist terminated a complementary relationship with a rival, liability turns on
business justification. This is not what the passage says. Rather, Aspen stands for the proposi-
tion that the plaintiff must adduce evidence that the defendant's conduct is exclusionary before a
business justification is relevant. Part of the evidence in Aspen of the exclusionary nature of the
conduct was competitive injury. Nothing in the passage implies that the termination of a com-
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conduct is presumptively exclusionary for antitrust purposes when, in light of
the market structure, it contributes to a monopolist's power and thereby in-
jures consumers.
Professor Baker, implicitly conceding that his interpretation of Aspen is
less than conclusive, contends that a narrower reading of Aspen (like the one
we offered above) does not survive Kodak.114 In the latter case, a manufac-
turer of high-volume photocopiers and micrographic equipment instituted a
policy that it would sell unique replacement parts only to equipment owners
that bought repair service from it or provided their own service. 115 Previ-
ously, independent service organizations ("ISOs") had been able to obtain
Kodak parts and sell service to equipment owners. 116 After Kodak imple-
mented the policy, ISOs could no longer acquire parts from Kodak or equip-
ment owners, and Kodak took steps to prevent ISOs from acquiring parts
from other sources, such as manufacturers that made and supplied the parts
to Kodak." 7 The policy largely prevented ISOs from servicing Kodak ma-
chines. 1" 8 The ISOs complained that, although Kodak had, by assumption,
plementary relationship automatically is exclusionary in an antitrust sense regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of evidence of consumer injury. Indeed, the Court makes clear that conduct is
not exclusionary unless it contributes to the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. See
id. at 483. Simply put, there must be an adverse effect on competition before finding that con-
duct is exclusionary.
114 Baker, supra note 17, at 500-01. Baker in particular takes issue with Judge Posner's
interpretation of the case. Id. at 500-01 n.25. Posner observed that Aspen "is narrowly written"
and concluded: "If it stands for any principle that goes beyond its unusual facts, it is that a
monopolist may be guilty of monopolization if it refuses to cooperate with a competitor in cir-
cumstances where some cooperation is indispensable to effective competition." Olympia Equip.
Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986). Posner observed that Aspen
"is not a conventional monopoly refusal-to-deal case ... because Aspen Highlands was never a
customer of Aspen Skiing Company." Id. at 377. Baker complains that Posner's distinction is
"unconvincing," because the two ski firms, "as sellers of products that were complements (in an
all-Aspen ski package) as well as substitutes, were in essentially the same economic relationship
as competitors who were also customers." Baker, supra note 17, at 500 n.25. Baker's economic
analysis is correct, but his criticism of Posner is misplaced. Posner accurately observed that
Aspen is not a conventional monopoly refusal-to-deal case, and he continued, "[b]ut it is like the
essential-facility cases in that the plaintiff could not compete with the defendant without being
able to offer its customers access to the defendant's larger facilities." Olympia, 797 F.2d at 377.
In effect, Posner makes the same economic point that Baker makes. Moreover, Posner's charac-
terization of Aspen as unusual is entirely appropriate. We would suggest, however, that Aspen
may stand for the troubling principle that a monopolist violates the antitrust laws by refusing to
continue to cooperate with a rival on terms demanded by the rival where cooperation would
generate an economic surplus.
115 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458. There is a dispute as to precisely what agreement Kodak
reached with its equipment owners. The Court understood that "Kodak would sell parts to third
parties only if they agreed not to buy service from" independent service organizations. Id. at
463. But in its opinion, the Court cites a passage from the appellate court that is slightly differ-
ent. The appellate court had stated: "Kodak entered into agreements with its equipment own-
ers.., that it will sell parts only to users 'who service only their own Kodak equipment."' Image
Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612,619 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting the terms
of sale), cited in Kodak, 504 U.S. at 463 n.8.
116 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 457.
117 Id. at 458.
118 Id.
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no market power in equipment markets,119 it had illegally tied the sale of
service for its equipment to the sale of its parts in violation of section 1 and
had attempted to monopolize the sale of service for its machines in violation
of section 2.120 After minimal discovery, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of Kodak.121
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that factual issues remained
for trial. 22 The Court held that the sale of Kodak parts and service for Ko-
dak machines could be separate antitrust markets.123 Kodak's principal de-
fense was that it could not exercise market power in these aftermarkets
because it lacked market power in equipment markets.124 The Court's rejec-
tion of that theoretical argument was the focus of its analysis of the tying
claim and served as the backdrop for its analysis of the monopolization claim
as well. 125 The Court reasoned that information and switching costs allowed
Kodak profitably to induce consumers to buy Kodak equipment, then exploit
this locked-in base through supracompetitive prices for parts and service. 126
The Court's logic was aided by the assumption that Kodak changed its
approach to parts distribution after consumers had purchased equipment. 127
Kodak claimed that exploitation of these locked-in consumers would inevita-
bly be a short-run game, because no new customer, aware of the supracom-
petitive package price, would elect to buy a Kodak machine. 128 It therefore
argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the al-
leged strategy was irrational, 129 but the Court rejected the argument, appar-
ently believing that, in theory, Kodak could sustain supracompetitive prices
in the aftermarkets despite lack of monopoly power in equipment.1 30
The ISOs did not ask the Court to find that Kodak had monopolized or
attempted to monopolize any market. Because the Court was reviewing a
grant of summary judgment in favor of Kodak,'131 the Court needed only to
find a plausible theory of competitive harm and that material facts were in
119 Id. at 465-66 n.10.
120 Id. at 459.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 486. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 460.
123 Id. at 462, 481.
124 See, e.g., id. at 465-67.
125 Id. at 467-78.
126 Id. at 473.
127 See id. at 457-58 (stating that ISOs were able to buy the parts in question from Kodak in
the early 1980s, but that Kodak stopped selling parts to them in 1985 and 1986). Lower courts
since Kodak have read the case to require plaintiffs to show that the defendant changed its policy
after the product or service was purchased. See, e.g., SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital
Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 18-22 (1st Cir. 1999); PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104
F.3d 811, 818-21 (6th Cir. 1997); Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 440
(3d Cir. 1997); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 762-63 (7th Cir.
1996); Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 23 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1994).
128 Kodak, 504 U.S. at 470.
129 Id. at 465-67.
130 Id. at 470-71. Our point is not that the Court's theoretical conclusion was correct. In
fact, we do not agree with it. But regardless of our disagreement with the Court's conclusion,
the Court did consider an array of evidence in its analysis of competitive injury.
131 Id. at 456.
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dispute in order to rule for the plaintiffs. To that end, the Court pointed to
evidence that "ISO's [sic] provide service at a price substantially lower than
Kodak does" and that "[s]ome customers found that the ISO service was of
higher quality."'132 The Court also cited evidence that "many [ISOs] were
forced out of business, while others lost substantial revenue," and that
"[c]ustomers were forced to switch to Kodak service even though they pre-
ferred ISO service."'1 33 Further, the record was clear that Kodak imposed its
new policy comprehensively, so that all ISOs were affected. 34
In the Court's view, the ISOs presented sufficient evidence to show that
Kodak's action was exclusionary to preclude summary judgment for Ko-
dak. 135 A jury could find the conduct to be exclusionary because there was
sufficient evidence of harm to competition, given the markets as defined, the
across-the-board impact on the monopolist's only significant class of competi-
tors, and evidence of actual harm to some consumers. 136 Once the Court
concluded that the trier of fact could find that the challenged policy contrib-
uted to the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, summary judg-
ment was improper unless Kodak offered a valid and sufficient business
justification that established beyond dispute that its policy was in fact effi-
132 Id. at 457.
133 Id. at 458.
134 Id. (Kodak's policy was to sell "only to buyers of Kodak equipment who use Kodak
service or repair their own machines" (emphasis added)).
135 Id. at 486. Unlike in Aspen, the evidence of adverse impact on consumers cited by the
Court does not fairly imply harm to competition in a relevant sense. The Kodak Court cites
evidence that some ISOs charged lower service prices than Kodak, that some customers found
that some ISOs provided higher quality of service than Kodak, and, not surprisingly in light of
the first two assertions, that some customers who preferred ISO service were forced to buy
service from Kodak. But changing its parts distribution policy might have increased the effi-
ciency with which Kodak supplied service. In that case, the disappointment of some consumers
might well have been offset by benefits to others. For present purposes, though, what is impor-
tant is that the Court believed that the plaintiffs had introduced evidence of competitive injury.
136 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486. Again, Baker argues that the Court cannot be said to have
inferred effect on competition from market structure because "the Court never makes this ob-
servation." Baker, supra note 17, at 502 n.33. There was no reason for the Court to state the
obvious, and the idea that the Court was oblivious to the importance of market structure is
simply untenable. Baker also dismisses the significance of the evidence that service prices
charged by Kodak allegedly rose, arguing that the Court cited this evidence only to bolster its
conclusion that Kodak was not entitled to summary judgment based on the competitive structure
of the equipment market. Id. But the Court also alluded to evidence that Kodak's policy led to
higher service prices by excluding low-cost ISOs in its recitation of the facts. See Kodak, 504
U.S. at 457-58. More generally, Baker seems to discount the Court's entire discussion of the
tying claim as of little relevance to the monopolization claim. But the Court unmistakably drew
upon its tying analysis in conducting its monopolization analysis. The Court explained, "As re-
counted at length above, [i.e., in the discussion of the tying claim,] respondents have presented
evidence that Kodak took exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used its con-
trol over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service market." Kodak, 504 U.S.
at 483 (emphasis added). The Court's conclusion that the plaintiff had stated a plausible case
that Kodak's conduct was exclusionary for section 2 purposes was derived almost entirely from
its analysis of the section 1 tying claim.
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cient. 37 The Court found that each of Kodak's asserted justifications raised
issues of fact.138
In sum, the Kodak Court did not state or imply that competitive injury is
to be inferred from lack of a business justification. To the contrary, the Court
found that the plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence of competitive
injury to avoid summary judgment. 139
I1. Proving Harm to Innovation in Monopolization Cases
Analysts on both sides of the issue tend to substitute assumptions for
evidence in resolving claims of harm to innovation in monopolization cases.
Professor Baker asserts that when a monopolist restricts a complementary
relationship with a rival without a business justification, the threat to innova-
tion is so great that the plaintiff should not be required to prove a reduction
in competition, and perhaps the defendant should not even be permitted to
rebut the presumption of such a reduction.140 And, as we show below, in
some recent cases, appellate courts have suggested that a monopolization de-
fendant's assertion of intellectual property rights provides a sweeping busi-
ness justification for refusals to deal with rivals. Both approaches to claims
of harm to innovation in monopolization cases are inadequate.
In our view, the plaintiff in a monopolization or attempted monopoliza-
tion case' 41 must articulate a credible theory of specific consumer harm and
support it with some evidence. If the plaintiff does not do so, the defendant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If the plaintiff offers a prima facie
case of consumer harm, the defendant is free to respond either by articulating
a procompetitive explanation for its conduct and supporting that with evi-
dence or by contesting the allegation that the conduct is likely to injure com-
petition. If the defendant comes forward with such a response, the resolution
of the case depends upon the strength of the competing stories. In addition,
when the plaintiff relies on a counterfactual inference that, absent the defen-
dant's conduct, consumers would be better off, a finding that the defendant's
conduct produced immediate and significant consumer benefits creates a pre-
sumption in favor of the defendant. In that event, the plaintiff loses unless it
can prove by compelling evidence that the expected cost of future consumer
harm exceeds the immediate benefits. As is plain from our discussion above,
we believe this approach is consistent with the analysis adopted by the Su-
preme Court.
137 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483.
138 Id.
139 That Baker misinterprets Kodak is reinforced by the Court's decision in Discon, which
was decided after Kodak and repudiated the approach Baker ascribes to Kodak. See supra notes
63-79 and accompanying text. If the Discon Court had intended to alter fundamentally an analy-
sis adopted only a few years earlier, one would have expected the Court to make its intention
plain.
140 Baker, supra note 17, at 517; supra note 21.
141 Our focus in this Article is on the section 2 offenses. But the approach could be used in
other contexts as well, such as claims of exclusion through exclusive dealing in violation of sec-
tion 1.
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In this Part, we explain the approach in more detail and argue that it
best accommodates the interests at stake. In addition, we reject the recent
tendency of courts of appeals to elide the question of business justification by
the invocation of intellectual property fights.
A. Why Section Two Plaintiffs Must Prove Consumer Harm
The ultimate goal of antitrust policy is to maximize social wealth by de-
terring anticompetitive conduct. 142 But antitrust enforcement is costly.1 43 It
is justified only to the extent that antitrust produces marginal gains in eco-
nomic welfare that exceed the costs of enforcement. 144 In general, antitrust
doctrines should be crafted to minimize the sum of the following costs: (1)
the expected costs of error in failing to impose liability for conduct that does
injure competition (a false negative in terms of the standard of efficiency);145
(2) the direct costs of litigation; and (3) the expected costs of error in impos-
ing liability for conduct that does not injure competition (a false positive).
These criteria focus on expected costs of error because any antitrust rule in-
volves some probability of a mistake with attendant costs. 146
The social loss associated with false negatives is the deadweight loss
from anticompetitive conduct that is not deterred. It includes the value of
products that would have been developed but for the conduct. The loss is
greatest when rules fail to proscribe easily identifiable monopolistic conduct.
The direct social cost of litigation includes the judicial and legal resources
consumed during litigation and the lost productivity of business personnel
whose attention is diverted to trial. Again, the more clear-cut the violation,
the more readily administrable the rule, and thus the lower the direct costs of
enforcing it. The costs of false positives mirror the costs of false negatives
and the direct costs of litigation. The more ambiguous the monopolistic con-
duct, and the more difficult it is to distinguish from productive conduct, the
greater the costs associated with false positives. These costs include the wel-
fare forgone when an efficient practice is avoided out of fear of misplaced
liability as well as the excessive investment in identifying antitrust risks and
in planning ways to avoid them. The incentive effect of the risk of erroneous
antitrust liability is magnified because of the large and punitive nature of the
potential sanctions. 147
142 See supra note 3.
143 See generally KENN= G. ELZINGA & WILLIAM BRErr, THE ANrTITuST PENALTIES: A
Stmr IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-11 (1976); William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Anti-
trust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1452-55 (1985).
144 See, e.g., ELZINGA & BRrr, supra note 143, at 12.
145 We use the term false negative to encompass underinclusiveness-instances in which a
rule clearly permits anticompetitive conduct. Application of such a rule to permit the practice
would be erroneous in terms of the standard of efficiency, even if the rule were correctly applied.
146 On the imprecision of legal rules generally, see Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal
Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 150 (1995). On the imprecision of antitrust
rules, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 3 (1984).
147 Successful plaintiffs in civil antitrust cases are entitled to recover threefold the damages
sustained as a result of the defendant's violation, along with the cost of suit and attorneys' fees.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994). Criminal sanctions, including fines and imprisonment, are available for
both section 1 and section 2 violations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994). In practice though, section 2
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These considerations imply first that a defendant should never be pre-
vented from proving absence of competitive harm to avoid liability in a mo-
nopolization case. A defendant may be able to establish the lack of
competitive injury easily, while proving a business justification may be diffi-
cult or impossible, and so permitting the defense minimizes litigation costs.' 48
In theory, if a particular practice always harms competition or if the defen-
dant can for some reason easily mislead the court into declaring an anticom-
petitive practice benign, prohibiting the defense might be justified. But no
such monopolizing conduct has been identified.
Second, the considerations imply that the plaintiff in a monopolization
case ordinarily must come forward with evidence of actual consumer harm.
Because the consumer interest is the central concern of antitrust law,14 9 good
evidence of consumer harm is normally the surest way of avoiding false nega-
tives, and good evidence of consumer benefit is the surest way of preventing
false positives. In unusual instances, relieving the plaintiff of the burden of
establishing competitive harm may make sense. If a robust theory predicts
that a practice, like horizontal price fixing, nearly always produces competi-
tive injury, but proving competitive injury in particular cases is difficult, the
practice should be presumptively unlawful. The difficulty of proof implies
that requiring the plaintiff to prove harm to competition would only increase
the direct costs of litigation and the expected costs of false negatives. But
this presumption would only be justified in the rare case that the practice
almost always harms competition.
Under Professor Baker's approach, when a monopolist restricts a com-
plementary relationship with a rival without a business justification, the
plaintiff is not obliged to prove consumer harm, and the defendant appar-
ently may not even rebut the presumption of harm.150 But existing theory
fails to justify such a per se rule. Refusing to maintain a vertical relationship
with a rival is often efficiency-enhancing: it may well reflect an effort to mini-
cases are almost never prosecuted criminally. Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation:
The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REv. 1383, 1436 n.242 (1998) ("Crimi-
nal prosecution under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is possible but has not been used as an
enforcement tool in modem times."). Property used pursuant to a conspiracy in restraint of
trade may be subject to forfeiture. 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1994). In addition, equitable relief ordered
pursuant to sections 15 or 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 25, 26 (1994), can impose ex-
traordinary costs on defendants. For example, the order entered by the district court in
Microsoft required, inter alia, the break-up of the company into two entities. See United States
v. Microsoft Corp.. 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000).
148 See Easterbrook, supra note 101, at 974-75. An argument for depriving the defendant
of the opportunity to show lack of competitive injury is that, though the defendant incurs lower
litigation costs, the plaintiff's costs on the competitive injury issue are higher than on the busi-
ness justification issue. The defendant has no incentive to consider the plaintiff's litigation costs
in deciding what defense to assert, and so opening the door for the defendant to assert lack of
competitive injury could result in higher total litigation costs. This strikes us as a remote possi-
bility. The sensible assumption is that permitting the defendant to assert the defense is likely to
lower litigation costs.
149 See supra note 3.
150 See supra note 21. Professor Baker suggests that the burden of production in asserting a
business justification is on the defendant, but who bears the burden of persuasion on the issue is
undecided. See Baker, supra note 17, at 504.
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mize costs or enhance value. 1' In most other cases it is competitively neu-
tral. Thus, Professor Baker's rule would systematically lead to false positives:
imposition of liability for conduct that is competitively benign or is mistak-
enly found to lack a business justification. And it would deter the termina-
tion of relationships whenever the costs of formulating a business
justification were significant, even if termination would be competitively neu-
tral. Although the rule would also reduce false negatives, Professor Baker
offers no empirical evidence showing that the avoided costs of false negatives
would outweigh the costs of false positives.
Proving likely future harm to competition is possible. A plaintiff can
prove predatory pricing by establishing, among other things, that the market
structure would allow the defendant to recoup predatory losses.152 A merger
can be condemned based on a prediction of likely future collusion'5 3 or pre-
dation. 54 Similarly, intellectual property licensing arrangements can be at-
tacked on the ground that they harm competition for the development of
new goods.'5 5 In all cases alleging that present conduct will harm competi-
tion in the future, whether by collusion or exclusion, the plaintiff must estab-
lish the conditions for the prediction of future harm to competition in order
to shift the burden to the defendant to establish the efficiency of the
transaction. 156
Allegations that an allegedly exclusionary practice inhibits innovation do
not change the issues. Standards used to assess the likely impact of mergers
and joint ventures on innovative activity offer useful guidance in defining the
kind of showing a plaintiff in a monopolization case must make when assert-
ing analogous harm.157 As those standards indicate, a plaintiff must at a min-
imum articulate a coherent theory explaining how particular conduct by the
defendant both will hamper innovation and is rational. Economics knows
too little about the conditions that promote optimum innovation to allow a
plaintiff to discharge its obligation by establishing merely that the defendant
caused an increase in concentration or imposed costs on some rival. Rather,
the plaintiff will almost always have to show that the defendant's conduct
injured a firm actively engaged in research and development designed to re-
sult in products or processes that will compete with the monopolist.158 A
151 See generally Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Inte-
gration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297
(1978).
152 Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Trumping the Areeda-Turner Test: The Recoup-
ment Standard in Brook Group, 62 ANrmrusr L.J. 559, 584 (1994) (explaining that the "plausi-
bility of recoupment . . . is accomplished by a fact-intensive examination of the market's
structure").
153 See, e.g., Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)
(noting that the ultimate issue in a merger case is "whether the challenged acquisition is likely to
facilitate collusion").
154 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 121-22 (1986) (recognizing
that in an appropriate case a competitor would have standing to block a merger because of the
threat of predatory pricing).
155 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, supra note 12, § 3.2.3.
156 See generally Page & Lopatka, supra note 10.
157 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JusT=E, supra note 12.
158 In any private case in which a firm alleges that it was wrongfully prevented from enter-
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claim that a firm might have pursued such a strategy had it not been injured
would be fatally speculative.159
Moreover, the conduct alleged must adversely affect enough competitors
to have a predictable impact on the market. If the conduct affects only a
single firm, there must be reason to believe that the victim has some unusual
advantage in pursuing research and development in competition with the mo-
nopolist. The enforcement agencies presume that the elimination of one
competitor through a joint venture when at least four other similarly situated
competitors remain is unlikely to injure competition in an innovation mar-
ket.160 Analogously, they presume a merger will not injure actual potential
competition, a future adverse effect, when three or more firms other than the
firm at issue have the same advantage in entry as that firm.161 Normally,
eliminating an innovation rival will not harm competition when a significant
number of comparable competitors remain uninjured. When an insignificant
number of firms are injured by the monopolist's conduct, the plaintiff at a
minimum must offer some evidence that the conduct deters innovation by an
appreciable number of other would-be competitors.
Once a plaintiff satisfactorily asserts the prospect of consumer injury, the
defendant may respond by asserting that the challenged conduct in fact bene-
fits consumers. The issue then turns on whether the net effect of the conduct
will be harmful or beneficial, discounting any predicted future effects to pre-
sent value. Conduct can in theory provide consumer benefits in the near
term, substantial consumer losses in the long term, and a negative net effect.
But a showing that conduct produces immediate, significant consumer bene-
fits should create a strong presumption in favor of legality when the alleged
consumer injury is merely predicted.
Predictions of future harm in real markets are necessarily uncertain.
Changes in taste and new competing or complementary products can topple
successful products. Advantages any firm might have in developing compet-
ing products are unlikely to be unique, and if unique, they are apt to be short-
lived. Firms tend to be surprisingly creative when healthy profits hang in the
balance. In retrospect, for example, the competitive forces that dissolved
IBM's dominance in computer markets seem obvious. But at the time, some
believed that IBM's commanding position in the industry was impregna-
ing a market, the plaintiff must establish not only a desire to enter, but also a substantial level of
ability and preparedness. See, e.g., Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705,
723 (11th Cir. 1984); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 474-75 (7th Cir.
1982); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 986-87 n.20 (5th Cir. 1977).
159 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, § 3.2.3 ("The Agencies will delineate an inno-
vation market only when capabilities to engage in the relevant research and development can be
associated with specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms.").
160 See id. § 3, Example 4.
161 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984). The sections of the 1984
Guidelines pertaining to potential competition were not supplanted by the 1992 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. See also 5 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrRUST LAW
1123, at 120-38 (1980) (suggesting that "elimination of a potential entrant should probably be
considered immaterial when the universe of potential entrants exceeds three firms and should
clearly be considered immaterial when it exceeds six").
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ble. 162 Antitrust should not sacrifice significant present consumer benefits
because of a prediction of remote and uncertain consumer injury.
Professor Baker argues that a truncated analysis is particularly appropri-
ate in winner-take-all markets. 163 In these markets, a single product or stan-
dard dominates because of scale economies in production, network effects, or
some other factor. 64 Baker seems to argue that, in such a market, a domi-
nant firm will be able to capture the full value of its innovations. 165 Conse-
quently, the firm's incentives to innovate will be so strong that it will
continue to innovate, even if it is prevented from severing a complementary
relationship with a firm that is trying to develop a competing product. The
vertically related firm, however, is particularly vulnerable to the dominant
firm's control over its supply, so its incentives to innovate are more fragile.
The assertion that the dominant firm will be unaffected is implausible.
Even extraordinarily strong incentives to innovate can be dampened by ill-
founded antitrust rules. In fact, a rule barring the dominant firm from sever-
ing vertical relationships is likely to be costly even if it does not deter the
dominant firm from innovating.1 66 Firms usually switch outlets or suppliers
for efficiency reasons; as Discon recognizes, their freedom to do so benefits
consumers. 67 To outlaw conduct that provides immediate consumer benefits
absent a compelling demonstration that consumers will eventually suffer off-
setting harm is unjustified.
Nor is it clear that in winner-take-all markets terminating a vertical rela-
tionship will have an appreciable effect on the efforts of competitors to de-
velop competing products. Markets do not tip forever.168 The existence of
significant monopoly profits is a powerful incentive to develop competing
products that will displace the presently dominant firm. Given the prospect
of these profits, the injury that results from being denied the preferred rela-
tionship may not be sufficiently severe to discourage the impaired firm from
innovating. Further, other firms, unaffected by the conduct, may be equally
well situated to innovate, or may simply acquire the injured firm's assets.
Not every potential competitor is likely to be vulnerable to the demands of
162 See John E. Lopatka, United States v. IBM" A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANrrrusT
LJ. 145, 158 (2000).
163 Baker, supra note 17, at 512-17.
164 See generally STAN J. LIEBOWrrz & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LosERs &
MICROsoFr 90-99 (1999).
165 Baker, supra note 17, at 513-14.
166 For example, Professor Baker states, "[e]nforcement of antitrust's prohibition against
monopolization thus can be expected to encourage fringe firm innovative effort without mark-
edly discouraging dominant firm innovative effort when innovation competition is winner-take-
all and the dominant firm takes advantage of a complementary or collaborative relationship to
exclude." Baker, supra note 17, at 514. Baker notes that, in winner-take-all markets, "it is un-
likely that small reductions in the expected return to the dominant firm would make much differ-
ence to that firm's innovative effort and prospects for innovation success." Id. at 515. The
predicted effect does not depend on whether the marginal loss in expected return flows from a
lost efficiency or the elimination of an exclusionary strategy that merely increases costs.
167 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1998).
168 John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Network Externalities, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
& EcoNoracs 952 (Boudwijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
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the dominant firm, because not every one of them is likely to occupy a supply
relationship with it.
Finally, dampening rivals' efforts at innovation in winner-take-all mar-
kets may have an insubstantial effect on consumers. The products in these
markets tend to be extraordinarily durable.169 As a consequence, once the
dominant firm achieves a substantial installed base of customers, its contin-
ued existence depends upon the development of products that render the
prior generation obsolete. 70 A computer operating system, for example,
does not wear out, and the seller, even if it faces no competitor, will soon
have to convince its prior customers to buy a better version, or, having no
new buyers, it will slide into commercial oblivion. The powerful incentives in
this market for the product leader to compete against itself diminishes the
importance of innovation rivals.
B. Why Intellectual Property Is Not a Universal Justification
A monopolist that owes its position in a product market to a patent or
copyright cannot in general be forced to license its intellectual property in
order to promote competition in that market. The patent and copyright laws
reflect Congress's evident determination that conferring limited monopolies
to spur innovation is dynamically efficient despite the static inefficiencies
they may create.171 The Patent Act now specifies that a patent owner does
not illegally extend the patent right by refusing to license the patent or to sell
the patented product.172 But patent owners may misuse the patent and vio-
late the antitrust laws if they "attempt to broaden the physical or temporal
scope of the patent monopoly."'1 73 The Act recognizes, for example, that ty-
ing arrangements may unlawfully extend the patent, where the patent owner
has market power. 174 These doctrines roughly parallel antitrust law's recog-
nition that a monopolist has a right to refuse to deal that may be lost if it is
accompanied by improper conditions. 175 But just where lawful exploitation
of intellectual property rights ends and where illegal extension begins is the
subject of heated debate.176
169 See, e.g., LIEBOWlTZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 164, at 258 (noting that, unlike most
other products, software, which tends to be sold in winner-take-all markets, "never wears out").
170 See, e.g., id. at 258-59.
171 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) ("[Tlhe limited
grant ... is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of
a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired.").
172 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (1994).
173 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971). On the
relationship between patent misuse and antitrust, see Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obso-
lete?, 110 HARV. L. Rav. 1922 (1997).
174 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994).
175 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985).
176 As one court recently put it, "[a]t the border of intellectual property monopolies and
antitrust markets lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by statute or the Supreme
Court." Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997).
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As we emphasize above, the Court's primary guide in recent antitrust
cases has been immediate consumer harm.177 In intellectual property law,
however, it is rarely clear where the consumer interest lies. Ideally, intellec-
tual property law seeks "to allow exclusion to the point where the marginal
gain in innovation or creation equals the marginal social cost of excluding
access to the work."'178 But no one knows if intellectual property law's pre-
sent definition of the duration and scope of the exclusive rights represents an
optimal balance of incentives and access.179 Courts regularly enforce intellec-
tual property rights that inflict serious immediate harm on consumers,
presuming that to do so is necessary to provide the proper incentives for
invention.180 Introduction of antitrust concepts does little to sharpen the fo-
cus of the consumer interest.
Two recent court of appeals decisions involving alleged refusals to deal
in aftermarkets reached very different accommodations of intellectual prop-
erty and antitrust concerns. Following remand from the Supreme Court's
decision in Kodak, discussed above,' 8' the plaintiff ISOs chose to pursue only
their section 2 claims that Kodak had sought to monopolize its service mar-
kets by refusing to sell replacement parts (some of which were patented) and
refusing to license copyrighted diagnostic software. 8 2 The trial court in-
structed the jury that Kodak's intellectual property rights provided no de-
fense if its actions otherwise constituted monopoly leveraging. 183 On appeal
from a jury verdict for the ISOs, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") disagreed, adopting the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit's view that "'a monopolist's desire to exclude others from its
[intellectual property] is a presumptively valid business justification. ' '184
Nevertheless, it held that the erroneous jury instruction was harmless, be-
cause the evidence showed that the presumption of a valid justification had
been rebutted: Kodak's refusal to sell its parts, the court held, was motivated
only by the desire to monopolize the service market, not by the desire to
enforce its intellectual property rights. 85
177 Supra Part I.
178 David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24 J.
CoRp. L. 485, 495 (1999).
179 See generally Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives. The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Reme-
dies, 97 MicH. L. REv. 985 (1999) (arguing that it may not be socially optimal for patent owners
to extract the full monopoly profit for their inventions); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. Rev. 839 (1990) (arguing that doc-
trines affecting patent scope should be interpreted to encourage "inventive rivalry").
180 E.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a firm operating an Internet site that facilitated the exchange of copyrighted music among
users probably was engaged in contributory infringement).
181 Supra Part I.B.2.
182 Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201, 1212 (9th Cir.
1997).
183 Id. at 1214.
184 Id. at 1218 (quoting Data Gen. v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d 1147, 1197 (1st Cir.
1994)) (emphasis added).
185 Id. at 1219-20.
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This result is dubious on several grounds. 18 6 First, the basis for the pre-
sumptive business justification was inadequate. The court acknowledged that
in tying cases the protection of intellectual property is not a valid business
justification,' s7 but insisted that "there is an important difference between § 1
tying and § 2 monopoly leveraging: the limiting principles of § 1 restrain
those claims from making the impact on intellectual property rights
threatened by § 2 monopoly leveraging claims."' 88 The court appeared to
suggest by this statement that the requirement of concerted action in tying
cases protects the policies of the intellectual property laws better than the
elements of monopolization. But concerted action only makes a restraint
more likely to reduce competition (and therefore less defensible) when the
concert is horizontal.189 In the context of tying, the concerted action is verti-
cal; the essence of the offense is the seller's unilateral imposition of a condi-
tion. The underlying economic concern in monopoly leveraging and tying
cases is the same.
Second, if the desire to exclude others from intellectual property pro-
vides a business justification, the court did not explain why the justification
should only be presumptive. 190 Monopoly leveraging necessarily involves a
desire to exclude others in order to increase profits. Consequently, all cases
in which intellectual property is used for monopoly leverage would seem to
involve a desire to exclude others. The court's suggestion that Kodak's asser-
tion of intellectual property rights was pretextual because Kodak really only
wanted to monopolize its service markets is unhelpful. 191 Such a standard
makes the issue of business justification hinge on the motivation for exclu-
sionary refusals, a determination that will be impossible to make
consistently. 192
186 Michelle Burtis and Bruce Kobayashi argued that the court's decision depended on the
fact that Kodak refused to sell both parts protected by intellectual property rights and unpro-
tected parts. Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, 9 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. (forthcoming
2001). They assert that the court might have conclusively permitted a refusal to deal limited to
protected parts. That reading is clever and textually defensible, but it is not wholly convincing.
187 Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1215-16.
188 Id. at 1217.
189 Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate of Morton Salt.: To
Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1066 (1999) ("In contrast to the rhetoric of Copperveld,
therefore, proof standards in most vertical cases are quite elevated, and do not evidence the
harsh treatment envisions [sic] by Copperweld for all 'concerted' actions. Today, that harsh
treatment is reserved for horizontal agreements lacking plausible business justifications and for
resale price maintenance." (citations omitted)).
190 James C. Burling, et al., The Antitrust Duty to Deal and Intellectual Property Rights, 24 J.
Corn. L. 527, 537 (1999) (noting that "in the intellectual property context, statutory protections
mean that, absent patent misuse, fraud in the acquisition of the patent, or some other qualifica-
tion of intellectual property rights, a monopolist is under all circumstances justified in asserting
its intellectual property rights to their fullest extent" regardless of any intent to exclude rivals).
191 Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1219
192 Id. The court said that the presumption of legitimacy can be rebutted not only by evi-
dence of pretext, but also by evidence that the monopolist acquired its intellectual property
rights in an unlawful manner. Id. To be sure, the illegal acquisition of a patent or copyright
results in no intellectual property that can be exploited free of antitrust exposure. See, e.g.,
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965) (holding
that fraud in the acquisition of a patent may serve as the predicate for a section 2 violation).
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In In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation,193 a case
closely analogous to Kodak, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit ("Federal Circuit") explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's presumptive
justification approach. 194 The plaintiff service organizations had alleged that
Xerox refused to sell patented parts and copyrighted manuals and to license
copyrighted diagnostic software to them unless they were also end-users of
Xerox's copiers, thereby leveraging its dominance in the equipment and parts
markets into dominance in the service market.195 The court repudiated the
relevance of Xerox's subjective motivation for refusing to sell or license its
patented products, holding that "[i]n the absence of any indication of illegal
tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the pat-
ent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust
laws."'1 96 The Federal Circuit reasoned that a unilateral refusal to sell or li-
cense, in contrast to a tying arrangement, is legal even if it has "an anticom-
petitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended
beyond the statutory patent grant.' 1 97 It did not matter to the court that the
exercise of intellectual property rights in certain antitrust markets allegedly
had anticompetitive effects in another. 198
The result in ISO avoids the troublesome inquiry into motivation pro-
posed by the Ninth Circuit in Kodak, but raises questions of its own. As an
economic matter, it is difficult to reconcile the sweeping business justification
in ISO with the treatment of tying arrangements in the Supreme Court's Ko-
dak decision.199 The court observed that, unlike ISO, "Kodak was a tying
case when it came before the Supreme Court."200 Yet the Kodak plaintiffs
also asserted section 2 claims,20 1 and nothing in the language or the logic of
193 In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("ISO").
194 Id. at 1332. Burtis and Kobayashi argue that the decisions in fact can be reconciled on
the ground that the Ninth Circuit might have adopted the Federal Circuit's approach if Kodak,
like ISO, had involved only a refusal to deal parts protected by intellectual property. See Burtis
& Kobayashi, supra note 186.
195 ISO, 203 F.3d at 1324-25.
196 Id. at 1327. The court announced a similar standard applicable to cases involving copy-
right protection, holding that, "in the absence of any evidence that the copyrights were obtained
by unlawful means or were used to gain monopoly power beyond the statutory copyright granted
by Congress," a copyright holder's "subjective motivation in asserting its right to exclude under
the copyright laws" may not be examined "for pretext." Id. at 1329.
197 Id. at 1327-28.
198 See id. at 1327 (noting that "absent exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer the
right to exclude competitors altogether in more than one antitrust market").
199 Supra Part II.B.2.
200 1SO, 203 F.3d at 1327. Though the two appellate courts reached different conclusions,
the Ninth Circuit, like the Federal Circuit, believed that the Supreme Court in Kodak did not
resolve the antitrust implications of "a unilateral refusal to deal in a patented or copyrighted
product." Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216 (9th Cir.
1997).
201 Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1201. Because the Federal Circuit must have known
that section 2 claims were made in that case, it apparently meant that even the section 2 claims
were based on tying as the exclusionary conduct. Nevertheless, exclusionary conduct need not
take the form of a tying agreement, and the court did not emphasize the importance of an agree-
ment in its section 2 analysis.
20011
HeinOnline  -- 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 395 2000-2001
The George Washington Law Review
the Supreme Court's decision suggests that the result would have been differ-
ent had the plaintiffs not asserted an agreement between equipment owners
and Kodak conditioning the purchase of parts on the purchase of service
from Kodak. The essence of an illegal tying violation, like the alleged unilat-
eral refusal to deal in ISO, is an extension of economic power in one market
into a separate market.202 Both appear to involve an anticompetitive effect
outside of the market in which intellectual property rights are held. But the
fact that a tying product is patented or copyrighted does not insulate the tie
from liability, 20 3 while in ISO, the existence of intellectual property protec-
tion is a complete defense to a monopolization claim based on a unilateral
refusal to deal.204
The Federal Circuit also attempted to distinguish ISO by observing that
"no patents had been asserted in defense of the antitrust claims against Ko-
dak. °205 But the plaintiffs in Kodak never challenged the legitimacy of Ko-
dak's market power in parts, regardless of its source. Whether that
dominance flowed from statutory intellectual property rights or some other
source would appear to be of no moment. In any event, Kodak could have
asserted such rights, because it did just that on remand.206 It is hard to be-
lieve that Kodak lost in the Supreme Court because of an oversight in
pleading.
The inadequacies of the approaches in Kodak and ISO stem from the
inadequacies of tying law and the specific language of the patent statute.
Lacking any clear indication of where the consumer interest lies, courts grasp
at formalistic resolutions. Tying law does not allow rational consideration of
the efficiencies of particular practices.20 7 Kodak, in particular, should have
been resolved for the defendant on grounds of market definition, wholly
apart from intellectual property issues.20 8 One can sympathize with courts
and litigants who seize upon an irrelevant difference, like the absence of an
agreement, to avoid outlawing an efficient unilateral refusal to license intel-
lectual property. They are attempting, admirably but disingenuously, to limit
the damaging reach of Kodak.
It may be, however, that Congress, in enacting 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) in
1988, intended to immunize all unilateral refusals to license patents from an-
202 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 25 ("Only if patients are forced
to purchase Roux's services as a result of the hospital's market power would the arrangement
have anticompetitive consequences.").
203 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947).
204 ISO, 203 F.3d at 1327-28, 1329.
205 Id. at 1327.
206 Kodak asserted that it "holds 220 valid United States patents covering 65 parts" for its
equipment and that all of its "diagnostic software and service software are copyrighted." Image
Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1214.
207 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 345 (1985); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Eco-
nomics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. Rav. 1, 2-4 (1997).
208 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the Kodak
Case, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1447, 1450 (1993); John E. Lopatka, Stephen Breyer and Modem Anti-
trust: A Snug Fit, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 75 (1995).
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titrust liability.209 Congress simultaneously enacted § 271(d)(5), which re-
quires a showing of market power to prove illegal extension of the patent
right through tying, apparently in order to overrule case law suggesting that
the patent itself conferred market power.210 One might infer that Congress
sought in both instances to limit the reach of antitrust in the patent context.
Such an interpretation is by no means necessary, however, and it would
threaten to create serious incongruities in antitrust law. The antitrust treat-
ment of tangible property and patents would differ because there is no blan-
ket antitrust immunity for unilateral refusals to deal in tangible property.211
Patent law and copyright law might diverge because there is no comparable
provision in the copyright statutes. And antitrust liability for withholding
patent rights from a would-be user might turn on whether the arrangement is
characterized as a unilateral refusal to deal or a tying arrangement.
It remains appropriate, therefore, to consider the possible competitive
effects of leveraging monopoly power that rests on intellectual property
rights. Both the law of tying and the law of monopoly leveraging seek to
prohibit a firm with economic power in one market, whether from intellec-
tual property or not, from extending that power into another market. A suf-
ficient condition for illegality should be that the monopolist, through its
conduct, derives monopoly profits in a market, in which its intellectual prop-
erty is not practiced, that it could not have obtained by fully exploiting its
monopoly power in markets in which that property is practiced. This condi-
tion is not satisfied merely because a patent owner derives profits from sales
in a separate market. For instance, the value of a patent monopoly may be
impossible to appropriate except through sales in an ancillary market.212 But,
209 Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)
("Section 271(d) clearly prevents an infringer from using a patent misuse defense when the pat-
ent owner has unilaterally refused a license, and may even herald the prohibition of all antitrust
claims and counterclaims premised on a refusal to license a patent." (emphasis added)). The
Ninth Circuit interpreted the language narrowly, Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1214 n.7,
but the district court in ISO gave it far greater weight, In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.,
989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (D. Kan. 1997) ("[Section 271(d)(4)] illustrates that a patent holder's
unilateral refusal to deal cannot constitute unlawful leveraging of monopoly power."). The court
of appeals stated only that the "patentee's right to exclude is further supported by section
271(d)." ISO, 203 F.3d at 1326. For an argument that section 271(d)(4) does not "remove[]
unilateral refusals to license a patent as a basis for any antitrust liability," see Marina Lao, Uni-
lateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 193, 206 (1999).
210 See, e.g, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (dictum) ("[I]f
the Government has granted the seller a patent.., it is fair to presume that the inability to buy
the product elsewhere gives the seller market power."). But see Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37
n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A common misconception has been that a patent or copy-
right... suffices to demonstrate market power."); Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 1991) ("A patent does not of itself establish a presumption of market power in the
antitrust sense."). See generally William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption of Economic
Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. Rev. 1140,
1150-51 (1985).
211 See Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel, 23 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. PoL'Y 159, 180 (1999) (arguing that "the generally applicable anti-competition policy
should apply equally to rights tangible and intangible").
212 See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980); Mercoid Corp.
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if proven, acquiring monopoly profits in a second antitrust market, in which
the protected property is not used, whether through tying or unilateral refus-
als to deal, is not included in a statutory grant of intellectual property rights
and should be open to antitrust analysis. For instance, a threat to withhold
access to intellectual property in order to induce a potential competitor to
refrain from developing a competing technology would not automatically es-
cape antitrust scrutiny.
III. Microsoft
The discussion so far has developed the analytical framework for anti-
trust cases alleging harm to innovation as a form of exclusion. In United
States v. Microsoft Corp., the most famous such case in recent years, the dis-
trict court concluded that Microsoft engaged in a variety of predatory acts in
order to suppress threats to its monopoly of operating systems.21 3 The heart
of the case is Judge Jackson's holding that Microsoft's bundling of its Web
browser, Internet Explorer ("IE"), into the Windows operating system con-
stituted both monopolization and tying.214 We limit our discussion here to
that aspect of the case.215
The practice constituted monopolization because "Microsoft bound In-
ternet Explorer to Windows with contractual and, later, technological
shackles in order to ensure the prominent (and ultimately permanent) pres-
ence of Internet Explorer on every Windows user's PC system, and to in-
crease the costs attendant to installing and using [Netscape's] Navigator on
any PCs running Windows. '216 This harm to Navigator prevented the evolu-
tion of Navigator into a competing middleware platform for applications that
would have eroded Microsoft's dominance in operating systems.2 17 Nor was
Microsoft able to offer a business justification that explained to Judge Jack-
son's satisfaction the full extent of the harm to Navigator.218 Microsoft's sug-
gested quality-related or technical justifications did not fully explain
Microsoft's refusal to license a version of Windows without IE.219 For exam-
ple, its assertion that it should have the ability to incorporate best of breed
v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). The Court in Mercoid was unsympathetic to the
plight of the holder of a combination patent consisting of staple components-wrongly so under
our analysis-but was partially rebuffed by Congress. Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 666-68; see 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c) (Supp. IV 1994).
213 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
214 Id. at 39, 49-51.
215 For a discussion of other aspects of the case, see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page,
Crafting a Microsoft Remedy that Serves Consumers, forthcoming in the GEo. MASON L. REv.
(2001); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, An Offer Netscape Couldn't Refuse?: The Antitrust
Implications of Microsoft's Proposal, 44 ANITRusT BULL. 679 (1999); John E. Lopatka & Wil-
Ham H. Page, A (Cautionary) Note on Remedies in the Microsoft Case, 13 ANIRUSrT 25 (Sum-
mer 1999); Lopatka & Page, supra note 13; William H. Page, Microsoft and the Public Choice
Critique of Antitrust, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1999).
216 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
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functionalities in browsers failed because IE is not the best of breed and
Microsoft knew it.22° Consequently, the inclusion of IE in Windows "cannot
truly be explained as an attempt to benefit consumers and improve the effi-
ciency of the software market generally, but rather as part of a larger cam-
paign to quash innovation that threatened its monopoly position. '221
The inclusion of IE in Windows was also, according to Judge Jackson, an
illegal tying arrangement.2 22 Illegal tying occurs only if the defendant links
two separate products.223 Many observers believed that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's ("D.C. Circuit") decision in a 1997 Microsoft
consent decree case stated the controlling standard for evaluating whether
separate products exist in cases of technological integration: the products are
integrated if the combination offered a facially plausible224 claim that the
bundling "combines functionalities ... in a way that offers advantages un-
available if the functionalities are bought separately and combined by the
purchaser." 22 Microsoft must thus make the relevant combination, and it
must offer benefits that a combination accomplished by the purchaser, for
example, by installing a stand-alone browser, would not provide. Though it
was interpreting a consent decree, the appellate court emphasized the need
to "keep procompetitive goals in mind" in resolving the integration issue.226
Moreover, the court asserted that the standard it announced was "consistent
with tying law." 227 Judge Jackson himself, in denying Microsoft's motion for
summary judgment, acknowledged with misgivings that the D.C. Circuit's
standard controlled the antitrust case. 2
If the D.C. Circuit's standard did control the case, Microsoft's inclusion
of IE in Windows undoubtedly created an integrated product.229 The court
of appeals stated that the combination of IE and Windows occurred at the
design stage, not at the moment of installation of IE from a separate disk.23 0
The integrated design offered some facially plausible benefits because it up-
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 50.
223 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 20-21 (1984).
224 United States v. Microsoft, 147 F.3d 935, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Because of "the limited
competence of courts to evaluate high-tech product designs and the high cost of error," id. at 950
n.13, a "court's evaluation of a claim of integration must be narrow and deferential," id. at 949-
50. The court retreated from this approach in its subsequent decision. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("To the extent that the [prior]
decision completely disclaimed judicial capacity to evaluate 'high-tech product design,' it cannot
be said to conform to prevailing antitrust doctrine... ." (citation omitted)). Nevertheless, the
court endorsed a general "[j]udicial deference to product innovation." Id. at 65.
225 Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 948. The combination "must be different from what the pur-
chaser could create from the separate products on his own" and the combined form must "be
better in some respect .... The concept of integration should exclude a case where the manufac-
turer has done nothing more than to metaphorically 'bolt' two products together." Id. at 949.
226 Id. at 946.
227 Id. at 950.
228 United States v. Microsoft Corp, No. CIV.A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *10 (D.D.C.
Sept. 14, 1998).
229 See generally William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, The Dubious Search for "Integration"
in the Microsoft Trial, 31 CoNN. L. Rv. 1251, 1265-69 (1999).
230 Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 952.
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graded nonbrowsing features of the operating system in ways that a
standalone browser could not.231 As Judge Jackson's appointed expert, Law-
rence Lessig, stated:
While this Court has found instances of the design of Windows 95/
98 that serve no efficiency function-indeed instances that hamper
the efficiency of Windows 95/98-the question is not whether there
is any bad in the design. The Court of Appeals' test is whether
there is "some good." The Court's findings indicate there is some
good, even if the Court believes that on balance the net is not
good.232
In the final decision on the merits, however, Judge Jackson concluded
that the D.C. Circuit did not intend the test to govern the legality of software
bundling under section 1233 and, if it did have such an intent, the test was
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent . 34 The test, according to Judge
Jackson, inappropriately deferred to the defendant's asserted perception of
the market, required only a facial assertion of benefits, and allowed no bal-
ancing of anticompetitive effects.235 In Judge Jackson's reading of the prece-
dents, even if a combination of products involves clear-cut efficiencies, the
products remain separate if consumers view them as different products, a
proxy for whether providing the products separately is efficient . 36 Because
consumers view browsers and operating systems as separate products, they
are so, no matter how thoroughly the code is commingled and no matter how
many benefits the combination provides. The court also noted that all other
sellers of operating systems offer browsers in separable form.237
The court recognized that other courts had treated issues of technologi-
cal tying differently from conventional tying arrangements, and Judge Jack-
son conceded that technological integrations hold the potential for greater
benefits than the typical tie.238 He further acknowledged that a "mechani-
cal[ ]" application of the separate products test would block virtually all up-
grades of software that involve addition of functionalities that had previously
been provided separately.239 But Judge Jackson deemed himself bound by
the Supreme Court's precedents. 240
In our experience, the judge's claim that he has no choice is often a
rhetorical ploy to avoid troublesome issues. The Supreme Court's antitrust
decisions do not require lower courts to ignore obvious benefits of practices
231 Id. at 951.
232 Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Lawrence Lessig at 16, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. CIV.A.98-1232) (citation omitted). Professor Lessig
noted that the court had found "some good" by "indirectly recognizing [the] platform value of
exposed browser functionality APIs" associated with IE's componentized design. Id.
233 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 47 (D.D.C. 2000).
234 Id. at 47-49.
235 Id. at 48-49.
236 Id.
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that literally come within a per se rule.241 Antitrust law exists to promote
consumer welfare;242 a court must return to that policy in its interpretation of
the scope of antitrust rules. The court initially must examine a complex prac-
tice to determine if its facial effects on consumer welfare justify their inclu-
sion in the same category as practices that precedent deems per se
unlawful.243 Such an analysis would have led to a different opinion in
Microsoft.
The surest indicator of the effect of a practice on efficiency is its immedi-
ate effect on consumers. If a cartel gains control over its members' produc-
tion decisions, consumers immediately pay more for the product and get less
of it. In the case of tying arrangements, the harm is subtler. Consumers do
not necessarily pay more; indeed the Supreme Court has recognized that a
seller is free to charge what it can for the products sold separately, including
a monopoly price for the tying product. 244 But if the products are linked,
even if the total price remains the same, consumers may be injured because
they are forced to pay for a product from the defendant that they may have
chosen to purchase elsewhere.245 The practice is thus thought to inhibit com-
petition on the merits: consumers do not choose the tied product based on its
intrinsic qualities and price, but because of the compulsion imposed by the
tie. This compulsion excludes the competing supplier of the tied product,
thus injuring the consumer.
One might in principle rebut a showing of this kind of forcing by evi-
dence of technological advantages, as the D.C. Circuit appeared to recog-
nize.246 But there should be no need to parse the technical issues in any
detail in Microsoft, because the decision to bundle IE with Windows does not
involve forcing. It results in a clear-cut consumer benefit, with no impair-
ment of consumer choice. At a minimum, the bundling provided those users
of Windows who preferred IE or were indifferent between browsers with the
convenience of preinstalled browsing functionality, without hurting those
who preferred Navigator.247 The district court itself recognized that "many-
241 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19, 23-24 (1979)
("BMI') (holding that a practice that literally fixes prices is not necessarily per se illegal price
fixing).
242 See supra note 3.
243 BMI, 441 U.S. at 19-20 (observing that whether a practice should be characterized as
price fixing depends upon "whether the practice facially appears to be one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output").
244 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984).
245 Id. at 15 ("[Tlhe freedom to select the best bargain in the second market is impaired by
his need to purchase the tying product, and perhaps by an inability to evaluate the true cost of
either product when they are available only as a package.").
246 Supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
247 The district court acknowledged as much, observing that Microsoft made it "signifi-
cantly less convenient" for users to obtain and use Navigator, because "[o]nce Internet Explorer
was seen as providing roughly the same browsing experience as Navigator, relatively few PC
users showed any inclination to expend the effort required to obtain and install Navigator."
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 89 (D.D.C. 1999). See generally Page &
Lopatka, supra note 10. This is not to say that convenient access was the only benefit from
integration; Microsoft demonstrated that integrating IE into Windows provided several other
consumer benefits.
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if not most-consumers can be said to benefit from Microsoft's provision of
Web browsing functionality with its Windows operating system at no addi-
tional charge." 248
Despite claims of immediate consumer harm,249 the inference is strong
that the integration produced immediate consumer benefits, which should be
sacrificed only if the prospect of long run benefits is compelling. Thus, the
burden of showing a long-term effect on innovation should be high, and the
record does not support an inference of such an effect on innovation from
this practice. Bundling Windows and 1E does not involve forcing for two
reasons: first, the inclusion of IE in Windows does not physically exclude
other browsers, and second, IE, and indeed all browsers, are free in all chan-
nels of distribution.25 0
The fact that the design of Windows does not prevent consumers from
installing a second, non-Microsoft browser means that the Windows/IE bun-
dle does not physically force consumers to choose IE over another browser.
If Windows were designed so that only IE would function on Windows, then
consumers who wanted a browser would be effectively forced to choose 1E.
Such a design would be exclusionary even if IE were not bundled with Win-
dows; consumers would only be able to use a browser by installing IE. But
Windows is not so designed, and the inclusion of IE, whatever its degree of
integration, does not impose any physical impediments to acquiring a second
browser.25 1 Nor is the nature of the products such that they can be used only
in fixed proportions. The government itself has recognized that many users
have and use two different browsers for different purposes on the same
computer.25 2
The fact that IE is free25 3 means that the purchase of the Windows/IE
bundle does not economically force consumers to use IE. Were the price of
IE and other browsers positive, the Windows/IE bundle would compel con-
sumers to pay for a browser along with Windows. That payment might satisfy
the demand of at least some consumers for a browser, if they viewed IE as
sufficient to their needs. The law of demand predicts that, having already
paid for one browser, the consumer would be willing to pay less, even zero,
for a second one, unless the second one had unique characteristics. 254 But,
248 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
249 Id. at 102 ("Many of [Microsoft's] actions have harmed consumers in ways that are
immediate and easily discernible.").
250 Id. at 35. Indeed, the court held that offering IE free to Internet access providers was a
predatory act. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2000).
251 The court suggested that consumers who preferred Navigator were injured because the
presence of a second browser on the hard drive resulted in a waste of valuable space and need-
less confusion. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 41, 102. In light of the capacity of modern computer
systems and assuming even minimal sophistication on the part of users, neither effect is
significant.
252 United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A.98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *9 n.13
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998).
253 See supra note 250.
254 E.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1979):
Before 1954, Kodak's Color Print and Processing Laboratories (CP&P) had a
nearly absolute monopoly of color photofinishing maintained by a variety of prac-
tices. Accounting for over 95% of color film sales, Kodak sold every roll with an
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because browsers are free in every channel of distribution from every source,
the inclusion of one browser does not affect the price consumers are willing
to pay for the second browser; it remains zero. Consumers are able, so far as
the cost of acquisition goes, to acquire the competing browser as they would
have been had IE not been included.
Judge Jackson, however, rejected the assertion that because JE was free
it was not a separate product. He reasoned that consumers "are forced to
take, and pay for, the entire package of software[,] and... any value to be
ascribed to Internet Explorer is built into this single price." 255 He quoted a
treatise for the proposition that a tie is present "when a machine is sold or
leased at a price that covers 'free' servicing. '25 6 But this statement is only
true if service is free solely in the specious sense that its price is included in a
package.25 7 If service were truly free in all channels of distribution, the inclu-
sion of free servicing in the price of a machine would not force consumers to
use the defendant's service because they could just as easily choose another
provider. This is the case with browsers: the court specifically found that IE
was included in Windows at no additional charge and all browsers are really
free.25 8 Because there is no increase in price when IE is included with Win-
dows, and the product is free from other sources, consumers' demand for
competing browsers is not satisfied by purchasing the package. They remain
free to acquire Navigator by other means at the same cost they would have
been required to pay had they not received IE with Windows.
It is true that consumers obtain the value of IE by paying a single price
for Windows. But obtaining that value does not force consumers economi-
cally to use only IE. Judge Jackson appears to respond to this point with the
following passage:
[T]he purpose of the Supreme Court's "forcing" inquiry is to expose
those product bundles that raise the cost or difficulty of doing busi-
ness for would-be competitors to prohibitively high levels, thereby
depriving consumers of the opportunity to evaluate a competing
product on its relative merits. It is not, as Microsoft suggests, simply
to punish firms on the basis of an increment in price attributable to
the tied product. 25 9
Judge Jackson thus recognized that the inclusion of IE in Windows does not
affect the price of Windows; it is simply the addition of value to the operating
system. Nevertheless, he held the inclusion to be unlawful.260
advance charge for processing included. Consumers had little choice but to
purchase Kodak film, and in so doing they acquired the right to have that film
developed and printed by CP&P at no further charge. Since few customers would
duplicate their costs to procure the services of a non-Kodak photofinisher, Kodak
was able to parlay its film monopoly to achieve equivalent market power in
photofinishing.
255 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2000).
256 Id. (quoting 3A PHIip E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTTrRusT LAW
760b6, at 51 (1996)).
257 See supra note 254.
258 See supra note 250
259 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
260 Id.
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It is true that an increment in price to consumers, in the sense of an
increase in the total price of the package, is not the essence of tying. The
essence of tying is forcing that inhibits competition on the merits.261 But an
increment in price, in the sense of an increase in the price of the tied products
by inclusion of the price of the tied product, is the very mechanism by which
consumers' choice would be forced. In the absence of a price increase, con-
sumers do not pay for a browser when they purchase Windows, so their free-
dom to choose another browser is unaffected.
There is, however, a sense in which Netscape is harmed by inclusion of
IE in Windows. Judge Jackson found that "few new users (i.e., ones not
merely upgrading from an old version of Navigator to a new one) had any
incentive to install-much less download and install-software to replicate a
function for which [original equipment manufacturers] and [Internet access
providers] were already placing perfectly adequate browsing software at their
disposal. '262 Providing IE free in this limited sense satisfies the demand for
browsing software. Having gotten a perfectly adequate browser free, con-
sumers would have less incentive to seek and acquire another. This inertia
works against a competitor. But it is beyond all reason to characterize the
inertia a free browser creates as "forcing" consumers.
The Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish characterized forcing as requiring
consumers to take something they "might have preferred to purchase else-
where on different terms. '263 Nothing involved in providing a free browser
prevents consumers who prefer another browser from acquiring one. Only
consumers who are indifferent among browsers or prefer IE will be influ-
enced by inclusion of the free browser. As the Court emphasized in Jefferson
Parish, consumers who are indifferent between suppliers are not forced to
buy anything.264 The harm to competitors from this sort of inertia is the by-
product of an unequivocal benefit to consumers-a free product provided to
consumers who want it at zero search costs. Because consumers are being
provided with something they would otherwise have had to acquire at some
cost, by downloading or through an Internet access provider, competitors
must now make it easier and more worthwhile for consumers who value their
browsers only slightly more than IE to acquire their browsers. This effect has
nothing to do with the bundling. Rather, it is the result of a zero price and
261 See supra note 245.
262 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 89 (D.D.C. 1999).
263 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
264 Id. at 27-28. The Court observed that, when products do not compete on price or qual-
ity because consumers are unable to evaluate their differences there is no forcing:
If consumers lack price consciousness, that fact will not force them to take an anes-
thesiologist whose services they do not want-their indifference to price will have
no impact on their willingness or ability to go to another hospital where they can
utilize the services of the anesthesiologist of their choice. Similarly, if consumers
cannot evaluate the quality of anesthesiological services, it follows that they are
indifferent between certified anesthesioligists even in the absence of a tying ar-
rangement-such an arrangement cannot be said to have foreclosed a choice that
would have otherwise been made on the merits.
Id. at 28.
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costless provision of the product. Given that the court does not find the price
itself predatory, it cannot be illegally exclusionary.2 65
Judge Jackson did point to other purported harms to consumers, not
from the bundle itself, but from the fact that IE is bound by shackles to Win-
dows. 266 For example, he referred to consumer demand for a browserless
version of Windows as a demand that Microsoft ignored for predatory rea-
sons3 67 There are, of course, features in any complex software that consume
system resources but do not provide value to all consumers. But whatever
inconvenience such consumers suffer has no antitrust significance. 268 If con-
sumers simply do not want those features, their inconvenience in accepting
them does not foreclose any other supplier and thus has no competitive
impact.
More important, whether consumers enjoyed benefits from not being
given the option to acquire unbundled versions of Windows is less clear than
that they derived gains from the integration itself. At a minimum, lack of an
easy method to obtain an unbundled version of Windows caused no signifi-
cant foreclosure injury. But in any event, we are unconvinced that the court
or the government would have been satisfied had Microsoft offered consum-
ers an unbundled version of Windows. The relative convenience of the bun-
dled version still would have provided Microsoft with an advantage
unavailable to Netscape; stripped to its essence, the case against Microsoft
was based on the proposition that Microsoft and Netscape should have been
on equal footing in promoting their browsers. Only then could there be com-
petition on the merits, under the theory of the case.
Judge Jackson also noted that Microsoft denied original equipment man-
ufacturers ("OEMs") the ability to provide a browserless version of Windows
or one with only Navigator.269 But interference with the preferences of
OEMs is not equivalent to interference with consumer preferences. To say
that OEMs can remove IE and other components of Windows is to say that
265 The court found that Microsoft gave up substantial resources it could have made by
selling IE, Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 35, but it did not characterize this choice as predatory
pricing.
266 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d. 30, 39 (D.D.C. 2000).
267 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 102.
268 For consumers who want to use Navigator, the only plausible adverse effects of design-
ing Windows so that 1E cannot be easily uninstalled are that more system memory is allocated to
browsers and that the desktop is cluttered by the inclusion of an unwanted icon. Given the
capacity of modem computers and the size of the desktop, and assuming normal competence on
the part of consumers, neither effect is significant. The court also found that Mcrosoft's method
of integrating E into the operating system's files caused the operating system to run more
slowly. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 44. But the precise act found anticompetitive by the court
was Microsoft's refusal to include an easy method to uninstall IE, not the means by which the
integration was accomplished. lI& at 46. The speed of the operating system after a prototype IE
removal program was run improved only slightly. Id. Particularly in light of the ever increasing
speed of modem computers, this difference is surely trivial. Finally, the court found that
Microsoft's integration exposes "those using Navigator on Windows 98 to security and privacy
risks" and subjects them to unexpected invocation of IE, and even injures those who use IE by
increasing the likelihood of a system crash and infection by viruses. Id. at 43-44. Even if these
harms exist, however, they are not the result of any lessening in competition.
269 It. at 102.
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they can sell exclusive rights in the desktop.270 Even if the OEM market is
competitive, OEMs may have incentives to sell a competing browser supplier
the right to be the only browser on the desktop, even if consumers would
prefer to have both browsers. This conclusion would be reinforced if, as the
court presumably would require, Microsoft were precluded from compensat-
ing OEMs for leaving IE on the desktop. It is by no means clear that con-
sumers would be better off if OEMs had this sort of power.
Quoting from Justice Steven's opinion in Jefferson Parish, Judge Jackson
stated that the "'essential characteristic"' of an illegal tying arrangement is a
seller's decision to exploit its market power over the tying product "'to force
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not
want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different
terms."' 271 The court's use of this language suggests that buyers who did not
want a browser at all would be harmed by receiving one. But in another
passage of the Jefferson Parish opinion, Justice Stevens recognized that
"when a purchaser is 'forced' to buy a product he would not have otherwise
bought even from another seller in the tied product market, there can be no
adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market which
would otherwise have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed. 272
Forcing consumers who want no browser to take one anyway, even if the
browser were not free, is of no competitive significance. These consumers
did not want Netscape's browser either, and so they could not have contrib-
uted to any long-run evolution of that browser into a competing operating
system.
The clearest effect of bundling is an immediate benefit to consumers.
The only significant harms from the bundling were to an existing monopolist
of browsing software, which was forced to reduce prices and improve its
product, effects that provided corresponding benefits to consumers. Though
the court does not quantify them, any immediate harms to consumers from
bundling are trivial by comparison. We are thus left with a comparison be-
tween an immediate, significant consumer benefit and the court's speculation
that, had Microsoft's competitors been properly nurtured, their products
would, by innovation, have enhanced competition in the operating system
market.273 In such a case, the claim of harm to innovation should be held to a
very high standard of proof.
The court, however, found that the bundling was illegal because the mo-
tivation for it made no economic sense except as a means of maintaining
monopoly power.274 This line of reasoning is quite similar to Baker's sugges-
tion that actions that harm potential competitors are illegal unless they are
supported by a legitimate business justification. 275 But Microsoft shows the
difficulty with such an approach. First, it ignores the exigencies of competi-
270 See generally LImEOWlTZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 164, at 260-63.
271 Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 12 (1984)).
272 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16.
273 Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d. at 103.
274 Id. at 37.
275 See supra notes 22, 60 and accompanying text.
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tion in winner-take-most markets in which it is essential to invest heavily to
build user share. Internet firms routinely attract investors even though they
have no profits and do not even project profits for years into the future. To
speak of conventional business justifications in such an environment is
meaningless.
More important, the BakerlMicrosoft approach devalues consumer in-
terests in an uncertain market. Where a practice provides immediate con-
sumer benefits, even if there is no apparent gain to the dominant firm, courts
should intervene only with caution. Thus, above-cost price-cutting with no
purpose other than to drive out a competitor and reinforce monopoly power
is per se lawful because its dominant effect is to benefit consumers. Such a
categorical good should not be sacrificed for a speculative bad.
!V. Intel
In the Intel litigation,276 which ended in a consent decree, the FTC al-
leged that Intel used its monopoly power in general-purpose microprocessors
to force several customers to grant Intel royalty-free licenses to microproces-
sor-related technology the customers owned.277 The complaint identified
three instances in which the customer had asserted that an Intel product in-
fringed its intellectual property rights.278 Intel responded by threatening to
withhold or actually withholding proprietary technical information, which the
FTC alleged was necessary for the profitable use of Intel products,279 unless
276 In re Intel Corp., No. 9288 (FTC filed June 8, 1998). The documents in this docket are
available at http://vww.ftc.govlosladjprold9928/.
277 See Complaint 11, In re Intel Corp. (FTC June 8, 1998) (No. 9288) ("Intel Compl.").
278 Intel Compl. 91 18, 28, 34. The alleged victims of Intel's tactics were Digital Equipment
Corp., Intel Compl. 9 15, Intergraph Corp., Intel Compl. 22, and Compaq Computer Corp.,
Intel Compl. 32. Intergraph, a manufacturer of computer workstations used in producing com-
puter-aided graphics, brought a parallel private claim. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 2 F.
Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998). The Federal Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction entered
in Intergraph's favor, holding that Intergraph was not a competitor of Intel and consequently
any refusal to continue supplying Intergraph with important proprietary information and techni-
cal assistance could not reduce competition. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 1999). The district court later dismissed all of Intergraph's antitrust claims on the
merits. Interegraph Corp. v. Intel Corp. 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2000). But this
disposition does not resolve the larger issue of a dominant firm's refusal to deal aimed at com-
pelling surrender of competing intellectual property rights. The relevant market was
microprocessors, and Intergraph claimed that it competed in this market by virtue of its patents
on the Clipper technology, which it had purchased from another company. See Intergraph, 195
F.3d at 1350, 1355. But the court found that, several years before Intel cut off Intergraph's
supply of special benefits, Intergraph had "abandoned the production of Clipper microproces-
sors.., and states no intention to return to it." Id. at 1355.
279 Intel Compl. 91 21, 31, 37. Intel was not accused of terminating a customer's supply of
microprocessors, but rather technical information, and in some cases advance chips, that was
necessary for the customer to derive the full value of the microprocessors and therefore remain
competitive in its output market. Id. 1 11. Still, the FTC asserted that "time to market is cru-
cial" in this industry and that "the denial of advance product information is tantamount to a
denial of actual parts, because an OEM customer lacking such information simply cannot design
new computer systems on a competitive schedule with other OEMs." FTC, ANALYSIS Or PRO-
POSED CONSENT ORDER TO Am PUBLIC Cornmrr (In re Intel Corp., No. 9288) (Mar. 17,1999),
available at http://wwv.fte.gov/os/1999/9903/. Intel denied that the information (or advance
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 407 2000-2001
The George Washington Law Review
the customer, in effect, dropped its infringement claim by granting Intel a
royalty-free license to use its intellectual property.28 0 According to the FTC,
Intel coerced customers into relinquishing critical intellectual property rights
in return for continued supplies of an essential input.281 Intel thereby further
entrenched its monopoly power by diminishing the incentives of the three
customers, and any other firm dependent on Intel that would observe the
plight of the three, to develop innovations relating to microprocessor tech-
nology. 82 If we assume that Intel had monopoly power283 and 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(d)(4) does not bar the FTC's claim,284 the interesting issue is when, if
ever, a dominant firm should be held to violate the antitrust laws by refusing
to supply valuable intellectual property to a customer unless the customer
abandons its infringement claim against the firm. We first consider the an-
ticompetitive potential of the practice, then address the possible business
justifications.
chips) was crucial to the profitable use of the microprocessors. See Brief for Intel Corp. at 11-12,
In re Intel Corp. (FTC Feb. 25, 1999) (No. 9288). For purposes of our analysis, we accept the
FTC's allegation about the importance of the information withheld, though note that it is a
critical part of the agency's theory. Whether the input withheld was the microprocessors them-
selves or ancillary products and services that as a matter of commercial reality were necessary
for the customer to be able to compete in the output market, the denial of that input would
impose a serious cost on the customer. From the standpoint of the customer, the only difference
is that the denial of the microprocessors themselves might impose a higher cost than the denial
of the information, but the prospect of either might be equally effective in coercing the customer
to surrender its intellectual property rights.
280 Intel Compl. 19, 29, 35. Intel also allegedly stopped supplying two of the victims-
Digital Equipment Corp. and Intergraph-microprocessor prototypes, or advance chips. Id.
19, 29.
281 Intel Compl. 11.
282 The FTC alleged that Intel's conduct reinforced Intel's dominance in at least three sepa-
rate ways. See FTC, supra note 279. One was the reduction in the incentives to innovate. The
FTC also claimed that the conduct tended to give Intel preferential access to the technologies
developed by many other firms in the industry, which gave Intel an advantage relative to com-
petitors in the microprocessor market. Id. Finally, the FTC claimed that the conduct made it
more difficult for OEMs to differentiate their computer systems from their competitors', thereby
making it more difficult for an OEM to serve as a platform for microprocessors that compete
with Intel's. Id. The theory of the last effect makes absolutely no sense. In any event, the claim
that Intel's conduct harms competition by reducing innovation is the critical one in the case, and
it is the only one we address here.
283 Intel denied that it has monopoly power. Intel Answer 6, In re Intel Corp., (FTC July
13, 1998) (No. 9288).
284 Intel claimed that the patent law, as well as the copyright law, does confer antitrust
protection. Brief for Intel Corp. at 49-56. As explained previously, we do not believe that
§ 271(d)(4) provides blanket antitrust immunity for conduct that can be described as a refusal to
license. See supra notes 209-211 and accompanying text. This provision's basic p-trpose seems to
be to protect a patentee's right to prevent licensees from competing with it by use of the paten-
tee's own patented property. The provision would even protect the patentee's right to prevent
use of its property when it is not itself participating in the relevant market. But the allegation
here was that Intel threatened to deny customers its intellectual property in order to induce
them not to compete using their own intellectual property. See McGowan, supra note 178, at
496-97 (arguing that the sort of coercive reciprocity alleged in Intel represents a departure from
the "pure exclusion" that should be immune from antitrust attack).
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A. A Showing of Competitive Harm
Under our approach, the plaintiff complaining about the kind of conduct
attributed to Intel must articulate a credible theory of harm to competition
and support it with some evidence. Like the theories of liability advanced by
Professor Baker2 85 and the district court in Microsoft,28 6 the FTC's theory of
liability rests on a presumption of consumer harm when a dominant firm
hurts a rival. While consumer harm in such a situation is theoretically possi-
ble, there are also theoretical objections. Even setting aside those objections,
the FT'C's case fails for lack of essential evidence.
1. The Hold-Up Scenario
A simple hypothetical captures the essence of the FTC's theory. Sup-
pose both parties agree that the infringement claimant has a one hundred
percent probability of winning a judgment for $100,000. as 7 If the defendant
terminates a supply relationship with the claimant and defends itself in the
infringement action, it will have to pay the judgment, and it will incur modest
additional costs totaling, say, $20,000, which reflect the direct costs of litiga-
tion, any loss associated with product-specific investments, and the slight cost
of losing one customer in a competitive market, assuming the worst possible
consequence for the customer of losing access to the valuable technical infor-
mation. We can assume that the claimant would incur roughly comparable
direct litigation costs,288 but termination would inflict a severe injury on it,
totaling, say, $300,000, because it has no feasible alternative supplier and it
cannot exit the market without cost. In this situation, the customer's vulnera-
bility arises not simply because the customer commits to a supply relationship
with a particular partner, but also because that partner is a monopolist.
The expected monetary value of the litigation for the defendant is -
$120,000 (the judgment and direct costs it must pay) and for the plaintiff is -
$200,000 (the judgment it will recover less the costs of termination). For sim-
285 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Professor Baker served as Director of the
Bureau of Economics of the FTC while the case against Intel was developed. Baker, supra note
17, at 495 n.*.
286 See supra notes 214-221 and accompanying text.
287 We make a number of simplifying assumptions in this example, none of which affects
our analysis. For example, the assumption that both parties have the same estimates of the
amount of the judgment and the probability of the plaintiff's success eliminates the possibility
that relative optimism would thwart a settlement. See generally RicHARD A. POSNER, Eco-
NOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 609-10 (5th ed. 1998). We also assume risk neutrality on the part of
both parties. But relaxing these assumptions would not affect the strategic value of bringing the
suit, which is the point of the model.
288 A successful patent or copyright infringement claimant may be allowed to recover attor-
neys' fees from the defendant. Under patent law, the prevailing party may be awarded reasona-
ble attorneys' fees in "exceptional cases." 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994). The Copyright Act allows the
court in its discretion to award "a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party." 17 U.S.C.
§ 505 (1994). We assume for simplicity that the claimant would expect to incur some un-
reimbursed litigation costs even if successful. There is a risk that attorneys' fees would not be
awarded to the successful claimant and other kinds of costs incident to the litigation will almost
certainly be unrecoverable. Nevertheless, the model could be modified so that litigation costs
are a function of the probability of success on the merits. See generally POSNER, supra note 287,
at 609. The change would complicate the model without affecting the point.
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plicity, assume that neither party would incur costs in settling the dispute.
The cooperative surplus, or the total amount that would be saved by avoiding
trial, is $320,000.289 If the parties agree to divide the surplus equally, the
defendant would pay the claimant nothing in a settlement. Instead, the plain-
tiff will simply forgo its meritorious infringement action, and the defendant
will thus appropriate the plaintiff's intellectual property in return for a con-
tinuous supply of inputs.290
In general, whenever the full expected costs of litigating a claim are
higher for one party than for the other, the party in the advantageous posi-
tion may have an opportunity to extract a favorable settlement. This condi-
tion implies a hold-up scenario. Here, the opportunity for a hold-up arises
because the costs of pursuing the infringement claim are asymmetrical and
fall disproportionately on the claimant. The danger to efficiency is that firms
dependent on the monopolist will have reduced incentives to innovate be-
cause the full rewards for their investments in innovative activity will be inse-
cure. Consumers suffer when disadvantaged rivals as well as any potential
competitors chilled by the prospect of hold up refrain from innovating.
2. Theoretical Difficulties
The use of hold-up as a viable anticompetitive strategy is a controversial
idea, so there is reason to view the FTC's story skeptically. While its theory
of consumer injury seems coherent, the predicted result is by no means cer-
tain to occur.
First, it is not clear that increasing the number of firms engaged in re-
search will increase innovation. Research and development may proceed
most efficiently when undertaken as a coordinated effort by a single firm.
Economics knows too little about the optimal industry structure for innova-
tion to reach the FTC's conclusion with any confidence. 291 Nevertheless, it is
certainly possible that the FTC's premise is correct, and the antitrust laws in
any event may embody a legislative judgment that competition to innovate
will benefit consumers.
Second, the FTC's case fails to distinguish between different forms of
innovation and the attendant incentives they create for market actors. Inno-
vation by a microprocessor customer might create a wholly noninfringing,
substitute microprocessor, or it might create an improvement to Intel's tech-
nology. In the latter case, the intellectual property of Intel and its customer
are complementary inputs that they can combine to produce a more valuable
289 In the language of game theory, the claimant's threat value is -$200,000, which is the
expected net monetary value of pursuing its claim. The defendant's threat value is -$120,000.
The noncooperative value of the game, which is the sum of the threat values, is -$320,000.
290 Technically, under these assumptions, the settlement due the claimant would equal the
claimant's threat value plus half of the cooperative surplus. That amount would be -$200,000 +
$160,000, or -$40,000. But obviously, the claimant would not pay the defendant $40,000 to re-
solve the dispute. The claimant would simply avoid the dispute by not suing for infringement.
291 See, e.g., Picker, supra note 211, at 172 (noting that it is next to impossible to assess
whether we as a society are doing the right level of research); Posner, supra note 28, at 939.
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product than either could produce separately. If the patents protect the intel-
lectual property involved, the patents would be termed blocking.292
The focus of the FTC's case on complementary innovation raises theo-
retical concerns. The loss of either substitute or complementary innovation
injures consumers, but the analytical implications are critically different. In-
tel would be hurt by development of a substitute but could well benefit by
development of a complement. Ideally, Intel would want to thwart substitute
innovations but encourage complementary innovations, at least when other
firms can innovate more efficiently than it can, and garner the maximum
share of the incremental profits associated with the resulting product im-
provements. This difference in incentives suggests that Intel's apparent hold-
ups involving complementary innovations may well have had more complex
goals than would first appear and might actually benefit consumers.
Although the FTC undoubtedly wanted to prevent Intel from sup-
pressing the development of substitute microprocessors, its case apparently
was based on the suppression of complementary innovation.293 When com-
plementary inputs are owned by separate monopolists, a double-marginaliza-
tion, or successive monopoly, problem arises. 294 Each firm will set a royalty
for its input at a monopoly level, taking the other input's monopoly royalty as
a given. The result is that deadweight loss is greater and total industry profits
are lower than would be the case if a single monopolist owned both inputs.
As Randal Picker points out, the royalty-free licenses that Intel was attempt-
ing to obtain from its complaining customers would have had the effect of
eliminating double-marginalization, a result that promised to benefit consum-
ers.295 Such licenses are equivalent to integration of the two input owners for
292 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 & n.5 (1931); WARD S.
BowmANi, JR., PATrEN AND A'rrrrusT LAw 201 (1973); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TNmN. L. REv. 75, 80 (1994).
293 In each of the instances outlined in the complaint, an Intel microprocessor allegedly
infringed another firm's patents, but there was no claim that the microprocessor did not also
embody valid patents owned by Intel. it is true that Intergraph allegedly owned the rights to a
competing, substitute technology. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). But Intergraph had abandoned the technology, and there was no allegation that any
firm wanted to resurrect it. Certainly Intergraph had no intention to return to it. See id. at 1355.
294 See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASSERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 31-34 (1983).
295 See Picker, supra note 211, at 178-80. In the context of this case, it was important only
that Intel obtain a royalty-free license to use the other firm's patent. No one expected the other
firm to receive a royalty-free license to use Intel's intellectual property, then market competing
microprocessors. Picker talks about the case as involving royalty-free cross-licensing, e.g., id. at
159, 178, but this is misleading. It is true that Intel was apparently offering licenses to use propri-
etary technical information and advance chips at no positive price in exchange for the other
firm's royalty-free license. But clearly what Intel was offering would not have been enough to
allow any of these firms to market noninfringing microprocessors, and it did not mean that the
firm could make microprocessors for its own use and pay Intel no royalties. There is good rea-
son for this. The basic, or dominant, patents owned by Intel were undeniably valid. To the
extent that these patents conferred monopoly power, and the FTC implicitly concedes that Intel
legitimately acquired monopoly power through its patents, Intel would expect a monopoly
profit. The complementary innovation owned by the other firm would have improved Intel's
product, thereby increasing the available monopoly profit. Intel would have insisted at a mini-
mum on the monopoly profit associated with its unimproved product. That would be Intel's
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these purposes.296 Picker criticizes the FTC for giving too little weight to the
benefits of royalty-free licenses. 297 He argues that Intel's conduct increased
the likelihood that Intel would obtain royalty-free licenses, and so that con-
duct, by eliminating double-marginalization, would have improved consumer
welfare in a static sense.298 Strictly from this perspective, the FTC harmed
consumers by restraining Intel's ability to withhold intellectual property as a
method of coercing firms to grant royalty-free licenses.
Picker's argument contains a questionable assumption. It depends on
the premise that Intel was less likely to obtain royalty-free licenses if it could
not threaten to withhold its own intellectual property.2 99 In fact, while the
division of surplus produced by a royalty-free license to use the complemen-
tary invention is likely to differ depending on Intel's ability to withhold its
intellectual property, it is not at all clear that the parties would be less likely
to strike a bargain. The complementary patent increases the value of Intel's
own dominant patents, 300 and the royalty-free license increases the total mo-
nopoly profits available from the improved product. Integration that elimi-
nates successive monopolies, other things equal, increases total industry
profits. 30 1 This condition does not, of course, guarantee that bargaining will
result in mutually beneficial licenses, even if both parties can withhold their
rights.30 2 But denying the ability to withhold does not foreclose an agree-
ment. If Intel could not buy a royalty-free license by supplying proprietary
information that it would otherwise withhold, Intel could buy it in other
ways, such as by charging a lower royalty rate on microprocessors. 303
The FTC's focus on complementary innovation raises other theoretical
problems. First, hold-up stories are often criticized for failing to take due
account of the injury a firm suffers by developing a reputation as a bandit
and thus deterring firms from dealing with it over the long run.30 4 When the
threat value, or the position it would have been in absent cooperation. The dispute with the
other firm would revolve around the division of the surplus profit created by the improvement
and the elimination of double-marginalization.
296 Id. at 178.
297 Id. at 180-81.
298 Id. at 178.
299 Id. at 181 ("There is every reason to think that it would be more difficult for Intel to get
access to the patents of others if it lacked the power to withhold its own intellectual property.").
300 The situation alleged does not appear to be one in which no product could be produced
without both firms' intellectual property. The allegation seems to be that earlier generations of
Intel microprocessors were not infringing and conferred monopoly power. Therefore, Intel
could make a microprocessor without the use of the other firm's intellectual property, albeit an
inferior one. For this reason, Intel's patents can fairly be described as dominant.
301 See BLAIR & KASSERMAN, supra note 294, at 34-35.
302 See generally Merges & Nelson, supra note 179.
303 Picker alludes to the "unexamined question of the relative importance for a licensor of
cash returns versus the in-kind returns that are obtained from cross-licenses." Picker, supra note
211, at 159. Though efficiency may be affected differently by the two kinds of payment, there is
no obvious reason to believe that the probability of cooperation is less if the payment by Intel
takes the form of a royalty rate reduction than the provision of in-kind services.
304 See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Origin, Meaning, Influence, 4 J.L. EcoN.
& ORG. 3, 44 (1988) ("[T]he propensity for opportunistic behavior is usually effectively checked
by the need to take account of the effect of the firm's actions on future business."). The reputa-
tional harm suffered by the predator is part of a broader objection, namely that the full costs to
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victim selects a supplier in a competitive market and becomes vulnerable by
making relationship-specific investments, post-hoc exploitation creates the
obvious risk for the supplier that customers in the future will choose other
suppliers. In Intel, of course, Intel allegedly did not have to worry about
losing customers to competing suppliers because it supposedly had a monop-
oly,30 5 but it would still be concerned about its perception among customers.
Intel might not mind developing a reputation for stealing substitute innova-
tions, the development of which it would like to deter. It does not, however,
want to deter the development of complementary innovations, which in-
crease the value of its own property, and so it should fear developing a repu-
tation for extorting this kind of intellectual property. And recall that the
FTC's case seems to revolve around just such complementary intellectual
property.306 Intel cannot systematically usurp the entire surplus generated by
complementary innovations without suppressing their development. Rather,
Intel has the delicate task of allowing the producer of complementary intel-
lectual property to receive just enough of the surplus to stimulate optimal
innovation but no more. It is unclear whether the facts of the case are consis-
tent with such a goal.307
Second, the FTC's theory of anticompetitive effect depends on Intel's
use of postcontractual hold up. But that story is less persuasive if Intel could
have reached the same objectives as easily at the contracting stage.308
Though the customer allegedly could not opt for an alternative supplier,309 it
was not obligated to enter the industry. Suppose, then, that Intel insisted on
a term in all of its supply contracts that gave it a royalty-free license to any
microprocessor-related intellectual property owned by the customer. From
Intel's perspective, such a clause might have the undesirable effect of deter-
ring complementary innovation, for the customer would be giving up a right
to share in the resulting surplus. Intel presumably would like to draft a con-
the predator of engaging in hold up are not taken into account by those who claim that hold up is
a rational anticompetitive strategy. Here, one might argue that supplying technical information
to customers returned benefits to Intel, as well as to the customers. Indeed, Intel admitted that
both parties to the transaction benefit, asserting that Intel expects valuable feedback from
OEMs that receive the information and advance microprocessors. See Brief for Intel Corp.
§ III.C., In re Intel Corp. (FTC Feb. 25, 1999) (No. 9288). But Intel also admitted that it would
not lose any valuable feedback by refusing to supply technical information to those who had
filed infringement actions against it because these firms are hostile toward Intel. Id.
305 See Intel Compl. 6.
306 See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
307 In the actual case, Intel was accused of demanding a royalty-free license to use the other
firm's intellectual property in exchange for continuing to supply technical information. Intel
Compl. 11. That implies that the other firm indeed received no share of the surplus created for
it got nothing new. But there is little public information about the terms of the deals struck
between Intel and others, and quite possibly the customers received or would have received
some payment, such as a reduced royalty on microprocessors purchased from Intel, in addition
to the advance technical information.
308 See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 297, 325 (1978) (discussing the use and limits of contracting
to prevent opportunistic behavior); see also Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-
Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 EcoN. INQUIRY 444, 449 (1996).
309 Again, the absence of an alternative supplier was an implication of Intel's alleged mo-
nopoly. See Intel CompL 6.
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tract that specified a reduction in the royalty paid by the customer for
microprocessors in exchange for a royalty-free license to use the customer's
intellectual property. This kind of contract would enable Intel to offer ex
ante a split of the surplus calibrated to the value of the innovation. But it
would seem difficult to draft such a contract before the innovation occurs. 310
In addition, if the potential customer knows it has valuable intellectual
property and Intel does not, it will refuse to enter into a contract that grants
Intel a royalty-free license without consideration. 311 Instead, it might choose
to pursue the development of a substitute microprocessor, whether the po-
tential customer had by then developed merely complementary intellectual
property or an unperfected substitute. This reaction is exactly wrong from
Intel's perspective. A better strategy for the monopolist is to share its profits
with its most likely potential rivals in order to reduce their incentive to de-
velop competing products.312
Third, hold-up stories tend to collapse if they do not account for meth-
ods by which victims can protect themselves. Intel presumably could not ex-
tort intellectual property from an entrenched customer by threatening to
raise the royalty for its microprocessors because the contract almost certainly
will guarantee the customer a price and quantity.313 But then why could not
the customer similarly protect itself from in-kind exploitation by insisting on
a contractual right to technical information and advance chips? 314 The FTC
seems to assume that OEMs lack the knowledge or sophistication necessary
to protect themselves from post-contractual opportunism, which is a weak
foundation for antitrust policy.
Still, one can imagine reasons why customers might be systematically
vulnerable. Maybe it is unreasonable to expect a customer to anticipate the
need for protection when it has no inkling that it will develop valuable intel-
lectual property during the contract term. Maybe the FTC believes that In-
tel, by virtue of its dominance, will be able to refuse a demand for such
protection. Maybe it would be difficult to write an enforceable contract that
prevents Intel from withholding intellectual property in response to a con-
310 This is not to say that the task is impossible. Commercial entities are often ingenious at
allocating risks contractually, but no solution is self-evident here.
311 Picker, supra note 211, at 189.
312 See id. at 186; Nancy T. Gallini, Deterrence by Market Sharing: A Strategic Incentive for
Licensing, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 931, 936 (1984) (demonstrating that an incumbent might share
the available rents with an entrant to reduce the entrant's incentive for further research).
313 We surmise that optimal investments by an OEM specific to a particular microprocessor
technology generally require a relatively long-term relationship between the OEM and the
microprocessor supplier. We would therefore expect contracts of substantial duration in this
industry.
314 Indeed, Intergraph alleged that it did have a contractual right to receive the technical
information withheld, but the court of appeals rejected the claim. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Intel provided the information at issue under agree-
ments that recited, "'[n]either party has any obligation to disclose Confidential Information to
the other,"' both parties may "'cease giving Confidential Information to the other party without
liability,"' and "either party can 'terminate this Agreement at any time without cause upon no-
tice to the other party' with return of the confidential information." Id. at 1364 (quoting a 1994
nondisclosure agreement). The court found that Intel had not modified these rights and obliga-
tions in a subsequent letter. Id. at 1366.
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fficting intellectual property right claim while preserving the flexibility to
withhold intellectual property for other reasons. Maybe firms likely to de-
velop intellectual property will be reluctant to signal that fact by demanding
contractual protection from in-kind exploitation, for fear that Intel would re-
fuse to enter into a supply relationship with them; indeed, we explain below
that owners of complementary intellectual property may have a strong incen-
tive to hide their status. This assumes that Intel, instead of trying to co-opt
its strongest potential rivals, would prefer to have nothing to do with them;
this, too, may be a rational anticompetitive strategy. This also assumes that
the refusal to initiate a supply relationship with a potential competitor is not
itself an antitrust violation, but it is doubtful that either the FTC or an anti-
trust court would recognize an obligation to begin to deal. 315 None of these
explanations is compelling, but perhaps there is something to them.
Finally, Intel has a strong interest in promoting competition in OEM
markets, so it would not necessarily be indifferent to the demise of a cus-
tomer. Intel certainly has an interest in encouraging innovations in OEM
technology that is not physically embodied in microprocessors. This technol-
ogy relates to Intel's microprocessors as a complementary product, and thus
these innovations stand to benefit Intel. But because Intel has not integrated
into OEM markets,316 there is no opportunity to eliminate double-marginal-
ization through a royalty-free license.
Despite some misgivings, we therefore conclude that the FTC satisfied its
burden of articulating a theory under which a monopolist's refusal to con-
tinue supplying important intellectual property unless the customer grants a
royalty-free license to its own intellectual property could injure consumers by
suppressing innovation. Though the monopolist has reason to encourage the
development of complementary innovations, the effective reward it offers
when it can threaten to withhold its own intellectual property may result in a
lower rate of innovation than is socially desirable. In a nutshell, the monopo-
list may use its right to withhold the intellectual property to obtain a larger
share of the surplus from the innovation than it otherwise would. As a result,
this distributional effect may adversely affect dynamic efficiency by reducing
incentives to innovate. Finally, we assume that potential victims of hold-up
could not or would not protect themselves contractually.
3. Evidentiary Failures
Theoretical possibility does not, however, prove consumer harm. For
example, the claimant in the hold-up example above Will pursue its infringe-
ment action if its expected recovery exceeds the cost of termination.317 It will
not be deterred. Further, consumers will not suffer unless the misappropria-
tion has a market-wide impact on competitive innovation, not simply an im-
315 In Intergraph's action, the district court held that Intel violated the antitrust laws by
enforcing its contractual right to terminate the supply of confidential information to Intergraph,
but the appellate court reversed. Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1364-65.
316 Although the district court in Intergraph found that Intel planned to enter the worksta-
tion market as an OEM, there was no evidence that it had entered the market. See id. at 1354,
1355, 1360.
317 See supra notes 287-290 and accompanying text.
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pact on one of the many equally well-situated innovators. The more often a
monopolist threatens to withhold intellectual property, the more likely the
adverse effect on the market in innovation. Repetition implies that more
firms are direct victims and that other potential rivals will find the threat
more believable. Nevertheless, a market-wide impact is not inevitable, for
the conduct may affect only an insignificant proportion of the firms engaged
in research and development. The plaintiff should be required to come for-
ward with some evidence, first, that firms dependent on the monopolist were
actually deterred from pursuing competitive innovation, and second, that the
market in innovation was likely to suffer. These requirements are important
given the tenuous nature of the anticompetitive theory in Intel.
One firm, Intergraph, had abandoned the technology that it claimed In-
tel's microprocessors infringed before Intel made any threat to restrict a sup-
ply relationship.318 Evidently, Intel did not deter Intergraph from competing
through innovation. Compaq, another of the alleged victims of Intel's tactics,
apparently did not compete with Intel in the development and sale of
microprocessors during the relevant period.319 Furthermore, the FTC of-
fered no other example of a firm actually deterred; rather, it relied upon a
theoretical prediction that Intel's conduct was bound to have such an effect
eventually.320
Moreover, Intel offered strong evidence that its conduct did not in fact
deter anyone from pursuing a course of innovation.321 Digital, the only one
of the three alleged victims that was engaged in the design and development
of general-purpose microprocessors at the relevant time, did not alter its ef-
forts as a result of Intel's conduct.322 Under the FIC's theory, of course, it
would not be sufficient to show that the research activities of the three firms
threatened by Intel were unaffected. Rather, any firm dependent on Intel's
products that was aware of the conduct could be deterred.323 Intel, therefore,
surveyed the universe of known microprocessor innovators, some fifteen
other firms, and offered evidence that Intel's conduct had not deterred any of
them. 324 Even if the evidence had indicated that a firm was chilled by Intel's
behavior, the requisite prediction of harm to competition would likely be un-
318 Intergraph, 195 F.3d at 1355.
319 Brief for Intel Corp. at 10, In re Intel Corp. (FTC Feb 25, 1999) (No. 9288) (stating that
the government's economic expert conceded that Compaq and Intergraph did not compete with
Intel).
320 The FTC complaint counsel's expert economics witness, F.M. Scherer, opined that the
consequences of Intel's conduct were likely "'to unravel over a period of probably ten or so
years, and it's just too early to assess those consequences."' Id. at 30 (quoting deposition
transcript).
321 See Id. at 10-19.
322 According to Intel, the chairman of Digital testified that the "company did not cancel,
curtail, delay, defer, scale back, reduce, or otherwise limit any research and development related
to microprocessors as a result of Intel's conduct." Id. at 12.
323 See Intel Compl. 14.
324 Brief for Intel Corp. at 13-14, In re Intel Corp. (FTC Feb. 25, 1999) (No. 9288). Of
course, this does not comprise the universe of firms that may be dependent on Intel products.
For example, in theory, the FTC could assert that a dependent firm would have entered the field
of microprocessor innovation but for the specter of Intel's strong-arm tactics. Given the evi-
dence that sixteen actual competitors were not deterred, however, it is inconceivable that the
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warranted. In a market of seventeen actual competitors, an adverse effect on
one would not imply probable consumer harm unless that firm was somehow
uniquely situated. To be successful, a plaintiff would have to offer evidence
that Intel had deterred an appreciable number of competitors.
In our view, therefore, the FTC's complaint counsel failed to meet its
burden of adducing evidence to support its theory of competitive harm. The
case should have failed at that point. Intel should certainly have been al-
lowed to offer evidence of the absence of competitive harm, as it did, though
such a showing was probably unnecessary in light of the deficiency in the
plaintiff's case.
B. Business Justifications
Proof of a business justification was unnecessary in Intel because the
FTC failed to make a prima facie case. But it is important for our purposes
to explore what that justification might be because the showing of potential
competitive harm might be made in another case. Intel suggested a business
justification that is a mirror image of the FTC's theory of anticompetitive
hold-up: Intel must be able to withhold its intellectual property to prevent
infringement claimants from holding it up because of the unrecoverable in-
vestments it has made in bringing the allegedly infringing microprocessor to
market.3 25
To understand Intel's argument, change the numbers in the earlier hypo-
thetical.326 Suppose the plaintiff has a claim for $100,000 in damages that
both parties believe has a ten percent chance of succeeding. The expected
monetary value of a damage award is $10,000. Suppose that the plaintiff ex-
pects to incur unrecouped costs of $9,000 in litigating the claim, so that the
expected net value of the litigation to it is $1,000. The defendant, however,
expects to incur litigation costs of $100,000 if the claim proceeds. Though the
direct costs of litigation for the parties are still assumed to be roughly compa-
rable, the full expected litigation costs are dramatically asymmetrical because
the defendant has made disproportionately large product-specific invest-
ments.327 The normal remedy in an infringement action includes an injunc-
tion barring future infringement.328 The defendant faces a ten percent
unsubstantiated possibility of a deterrent effect on a potential competitor would cause a cogniza-
ble harm to consumers.
325 Intel in fact asserted several business justifications for its conduct. See Id. § III.C. They
included, in addition to the one described in the text, an argument apparently similar to Profes-
sor Picker's claim that withholding intellectual property promotes cross-licensing of technology.
Id.; Picker, supra note 211.
326 See supra notes 287-290 and accompanying text.
327 The defendant, for example, may have invested heavily in promoting its new product. It
may have built production facilities uniquely tailored to its technology. Some proportion of
research and development costs are likely to be product specific. Whatever the reason, so long
as the return on the investment depends upon the sale of this particular product or technology,
the defendant is vulnerable.
328 See, e.g., Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("When a copy-
right plaintiff has established a threat of continuing infringement, he is entitled to an injunc-
tion."); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("Infringement
having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of which the patent law partakes,
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chance of losing far more if the court enjoins it from selling its products than
the plaintiff stands to lose if the claim fails. The expected net value of the
claim to such a defendant is $110,000. Again assuming zero settlement costs,
the cooperative surplus is $109,000.329 The parties could be expected to settle
the claim by dividing the surplus, perhaps on a fifty-fifty basis.330 In that
case, the defendant would pay the plaintiff $55,500. The plaintiff is better off
by $54,500 than it would have been had it litigated the claim, and the defen-
dant is better off by $54,500.
In this scenario, the plaintiff earns $55,500 on a claim that both parties
agree had an expected monetary value of only $10,000. This logic implies
that a plaintiff may profit from bringing a claim even when the claim has a
negative expected monetary value, such as one that would cost the plaintiff
more to litigate than the expected value of the recovery.331 Indeed, if the
pendency of the litigation prevented the defendant from ever recouping
product-specific investments, the plaintiff could exact a favorable settlement
even if the parties agreed that the claim had a zero percent chance of success.
These circumstances may give rise to a business justification for a refusal
to deal. This kind of hold-up distorts the monopolist's incentives by encour-
aging it, first, to reduce technology-specific investments in developing and
marketing its products and, second, to increase spending on otherwise unnec-
essary measures to protect against exploitation. The monopolist might there-
fore be justified in threatening to terminate an important supply relationship
with the claimant if the claimant pursues its claim. Assume that termination
would impose a cost of $91,000, reducing the expected monetary value of the
claim to the plaintiff to -$90,000. Because the value of the claim to the defen-
dant is still -$110,000, the parties' cooperative surplus is $200,000. If they
divide the surplus equally, the defendant will settle the patent claim for
$10,000. In these circumstances, the mutual hold-up results in the claimant
receiving the expected monetary value of the judgment. As a general matter,
if the full expected costs of continued litigation are perfectly symmetrical and
the other simplifying assumptions used above are made, the settlement
amount will always equal the expected monetary value of the judgment.
The claim that a monopolist must be free to stop supplying intellectual
property as a defense to hold up has its own weaknesses. A technologically
complex product may use hundreds of patents, and it may arguably infringe
hundreds of other patents held by a host of individuals some of whose identi-
ties are not even known. Indeed, some of these individuals may have pur-
chased their patent rights solely in order to bring infringement actions against
to deny the patentee's right to exclude others from use of his property .... It is the general rule
that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for
denying it.").
329 In these circumstances, the plaintiff's threat value is $1,000, the defendant's threat value
is -$110,000, and the noncooperative value of the game is -$109,000.
330 An equal division of the surplus is a conventional assumption in bargaining models, but
the point of the example is unaffected if other divisions are assumed.
331 A nuisance suit can be defined as one in which the plaintiff's expected monetary value
of trial is nonpositive. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMIcs 403 (3d
ed. 2000). The example above demonstrates that nuisance suits can be rational in the context of
intellectual property infringement actions.
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the dominant firm. By developing its product, the dominant firm must cross
a patent minefield. 332 The transaction costs of resolving all potential intellec-
tual property disputes before development are prohibitive, but cutting off the
supply of technical information can at best only have a coercive effect on
those infringement claimants that are Intel licensees. As to these firms, Intel
potentially could have demanded a term in the original licensing contracts
granting Intel a royalty-free license to use their property, thereby protecting
itself from hold-up. If it did not do so, perhaps it ought not be shielded from
antitrust charges based on the unilateral refusal to continue to supply the
relevant input. The ability of customers and the ability of the monopolist to
protect themselves from hold-up contractually seem roughly symmetrical.
The justification, however, is more substantial than it might first appear.
First, at least in Intergraph's case, Intel claimed that it did acquire just such a
royalty-free license in its contract to use any intellectual property owned by
Intergraph that was infringed by its microprocessors, though a district court
rejected the assertion.333 The fact that the scope of the cross-licensing provi-
sion was seriously disputed may suggest that these contractual provisions are
more difficult to draft than one might think. Further, even if Intel secured
such a contractual right, the FTC might claim that insisting on the provision
is itself anticompetitive. After all, in the agency's view, the chief harm
presented by the termination of a supply relationship in response to an in-
fringement claim is the potential reduction in the incentives to innovate.334
The cross-licensing provision arguably has the same effect, even if such
agreements are common in high-tech industries. 335 Moreover, Intel may be
reluctant to insist on such a term generally for fear that it would encourage
rivals to develop competing microprocessors. That is not much of an excuse
in an antitrust context, but it would be a stretch to say that the reason for not
seeking a contractual right to a royalty-free license initially is illegitimate.
Despite our reservations, we assume that an intellectual property mo-
nopolist's refusal to deal with an infringement claimant may represent either
an inefficient hold-up or an efficient response to an attempted hold-up. One
way to address this dilemma is to permit the monopolist to restrict or sever
its relationship with the claimant in all circumstances but include the dam-
ages caused by termination in a successful claimant's infringement recovery.
The recovery would then equal infringement damages plus termination dam-
ages. This resolution would tend to make the net expected costs of pursuing
the litigation symmetrical and thereby lessen the monopolist's ability to hold
332 See Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition (FTC Nov. 29, 1995) (state-
ment of F.M. Scherer), available at http:llwww.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC112995.htm. The testimony
is quoted in Ronald W. Davis, The FTC's Intel Case: What Are the Limitations on "Throwing
Your Weight Around" Using Intellectual Property Rights?, 13 ANrrrrusT 47, 49 (Summer 1999).
In a recent example, British Telecommunications PLC announced plans to seek licensing fees
under a U.S. patent it filed in 1976 covering hyperlink technology, the widely used tool for
linking Web sites on the Internet. Stephanie Gruner & David Pringle, British Telecom Looks to
Collect for Hyperlinks, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2000, at B5.
333 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., CV 97-N-3023-NE (N.D. Ala. June 4, 1999).
334 Intel Compl. 14.
335 See generally Picker, supra note 211, at 188 (observing that royalty-free licenses between
trading partners are "the order of the day in the high-tech business").
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up the claimant by threatening to terminate a critical supply relationship. In-
deed, the defendant's full litigation costs may then exceed the claimant's ex-
pected net litigation costs to the extent that the defendant incurs some cost in
refusing to supply the claimant. But such a remedy is probably not available
under intellectual property law.336 Further, the remedy could leave the
claimant vulnerable to the extent that it cannot expect to recover fully com-
pensatory damages caused by termination.
Another response is to prevent the defendant from terminating the sup-
ply relationship with the claimant, and also prohibit the claimant from pursu-
ing injunctive relief for infringement. This resolution is essentially what Intel
agreed to accept in the FTC's case against it: Intel may not restrict a supply
relationship with a customer claiming infringement so long as the claimant
agrees to forgo injunctive relief in its case.337 The logic behind this approach
is that it prevents the supplier from holding up the customer, but only if the
customer severely curtails its ability to hold up the supplier. Recall that the
supplier can be held up only if it incurs disproportionately large indirect costs
as a result of the infringement action, and these costs are primarily a product
of the claimant's ability to render the monopolist's product-specific invest-
ments valueless by having future infringement enjoined. Thus, the net ex-
pected monetary value of pursuing the infringement claim when the
monopolist cannot sever the supply relationship and the claimant cannot pro-
cure an injunction will tend to be symmetrical between the parties. Under
the assumptions used above, the monopolist and the claimant will settle the
infringement claim for approximately its expected monetary value.338
Although the FTC and Intel reached an imaginative resolution of their
dispute, that settlement does not resolve the status of a retaliatory termina-
tion of a supply relationship as a business justification in antitrust litigation.
336 In general, a patentee is entitled to damages for past infringement measured either by
the lost profits attributable to the infringement or a court-determined reasonable royalty. A
court may treble damages if it finds that the defendant's infringement was willful or deliberate.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). See generally ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW EsSENrtIALS 161-64
(1999); MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPsTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.04[E][2-[3] (4th ed.
1999). Neither measure would include profits lost by the claimant, not because of the infringe-
ment, but because of the inability to obtain a supply of the infringer's products. Similarly, a
copyright holder may recover statutory damages or "the actual damages suffered by him or her
as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the in-
fringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b)
(1994). See generally 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 14.01 (2000). Again, the measures would not appear to include termination damages.
337 Agreement Containing Consent Order I II.A, In re Intel Corp. (FTC Mar. 17, 1999)
(No. 9288), available at http://www.ftc.govlos/1999/9903/.
338 The FTC and Intel apparently envision that a claimant successful at trial would recover
damages for past infringement. A claimant could not recover the present value of future in-
fringement damages because the damages could not be calculated with acceptable precision.
The claimant would, however, have the right to return to court and recover any damages sus-
tained since the last award. In reality, the parties would be expected to settle the dispute after
the resolution of the merits. The greatest obstacle to settlement of any claim is the relative
optimism about the probability and magnitude of recovery. Once a court has ruled in the claim-
ant's favor, both parties will assume that a subsequent action would have virtually a one hundred
percent chance of success, and the method of calculating damages will have been decided. At
that point, settlement is all but assured.
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Suppose the monopolist in fact cuts off a claimant that is suing for an injunc-
tion. May it assert the hold-up rationale as a justification? 339 We are inclined
to treat the defense skeptically because, like the FTC's theory of liability, it
rests on an unwarranted generalization from a merely plausible scenario. We
are not confident that efficient instances can be isolated, and we expect that
the harm from erroneous rejection of the defense will do minimal harm.
Under our approach, the justification would become relevant only after
the plaintiff has established the defendant's market power and likely compet-
itive harm. The terminated firm must be one of only a few firms equally well-
situated to develop a competing technology because otherwise, any cost im-
posed on it will have no market-wide effect on innovation. The firm must be
near the stage at which its innovation can be marketed, because otherwise
the claim of consumer injury is fatally speculative. But the firm cannot in fact
have finished developing the technology, because otherwise, the defendant
will likely lack the power to induce the firm to relent. Finally, there can be
no good alternative suppliers of the necessary input, or again, the defendant
will lack market power.
Many refusal-to-deal cases are likely to founder at this stage. If the
plaintiff satisfies the necessary elements though, and the defendant wants to
assert the hold-up justification, we would require a persuasive showing that
tends to exclude the possibility of inefficient hold-up. The analysis above
suggests that the defendant would have to demonstrate that its product-spe-
cific investments substantially exceed the plaintiff's expected litigation costs.
An unexplained delay by the plaintiff in asserting its infringement claim, for
example, might suggest a plan to hold up the defendant. In the usual case,
presumably a finn's investments in its products will increase over time. A
claimant bent on hold-up has an incentive to increase its likely payoff by
lying in wait while the defendant's investments mount. The doctrine of
laches should deter such opportunistic behavior to some extent because its
application would reduce the claimant's recovery.34 0 Because proving that
the claimant unreasonably and inexcusably delayed in filing suit is likely to
be difficult, however, the claimant might be willing to run the risk.341 We
doubt that the monopolist could show a hold-up scheme in many cases, but
the showing may be possible in some.
339 Indeed, under the consent decree, Intel is free to cut-off a customer that refuses to forgo
a request for injunctive relief in an infringement action, see supra note 337 and accompanying
text, and presumably that customer could allege in a private action that the termination violates
the antitrust law.
340 The equitable principle of laches applies in both patent and copyright infringement ac-
tions to bar recovery of damages incurred before trial in limited circumstances. E.g., A.C.
Aukerman Co. v. R. L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(patent); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 1989) (copyright). See generally
DuRaAm, supra note 336, at 169; 3 NIMMER, supra note 336, at §12.06; EPSTEIN, supra note 336,
at §§ 4.02[C][4], 5.04[D][4].
341 See Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032 (holding that laches in a patent case requires unreason-
able and inexcusable delay); MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc.,
952 F.2d 769, 780 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that laches in a copyright infringement case requires a
showing that the plaintiff "engaged in unreasonable and inexcusable delay that prejudiced the
defendant").
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This hold-up justification, in any event, assumes that the monopolist acts
in response to an infringement claim. It would not comfortably apply if the
monopolist used the threat of termination to deter a potential rival from de-
veloping competing intellectual property, claiming that the rival, if successful,
would ultimately try to hold up the monopolist. For example, Microsoft was
accused of threatening to impair access to its products by vertically-related
firms or otherwise impose burdensome conditions on them if they pursued
plans to develop competing products. 342 The monopolist could not justify
such conduct as a response to potential hold-up because the threat to the
monopolist would likely be far too remote to be cognizable.
A more general business justification for refusing to supply essential in-
tellectual property concerns the risk of misappropriation by the recipient 43
The monopolist may fear that a recipient will use its intellectual property to
develop a competing product. 344 The monopolist will be able to prohibit such
misuse contractually because voluntary disclosure implies a contractual rela-
tionship between the two parties. But breach of the contract may be difficult
to prove, especially given the intangible nature of the subject matter. The
cost to the monopolist of cutting off the culprit may be less than the cost of
litigating a contract claim. In these circumstances, the refusal to deal with the
firm, whether it takes the form of a termination of an existing relationship or
the refusal to enter into a relationship, is in effect a more efficient method of
securing property interests than is contract law. The fact that the monopolist
selectively cuts off a customer that is in the process of developing a compet-
ing product, instead of customers that are not, does not suggest an anticom-
petitive intent but supports the justification.
In our view, the theory behind this justification is sound, but again we
are skeptical about its application in litigation. The danger is that the defense
will be used as a pretext in cases where the monopolist is merely attempting
to stifle legitimate competition. A monopolist could demonstrate a well-
founded fear of misappropriation despite the ability to resort to contract law.
For instance, the justification would have merit if in prior litigation the termi-
nated firm had been found liable for breach of contract by misusing intellec-
tual property, or the monopolist might prove that contractual security is
peculiarly ineffective in a particular case. We would accept the justification
when the monopolist demonstrates that termination was a more efficient
method of intellectual property protection than was contract law, but we are
not sanguine that the showing could often be made. In any event, the de-
342 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24-34 (D.D.C. 1999) (recounting
instances with Netscape, Intel, Apple, RealNetworks, and IBM).
343 Intel suggests this justification as well. See Brief for Intel Corp. § III.C, In re Intel Corp.
(FTC Feb. 25, 1999) (No. 9288).
344 For example, the consent order in Intel permits Intel to restrict the use of its technical
information "to the customer's design and development of computer systems that incorporate
the microprocessor to which the [technical] information pertains." Agreement Containing Con-
sent Order I II.B.5, In re Intel Corp. (FFC Mar. 17, 1999) (No. 9288), available at http://
www.ftc.govlos/199919903/. Apparently, the point of this provision is to recognize Intel's right to
try to prevent its intellectual property from being misappropriated for use in potentially compet-
ing products.
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fense will not be relevant unless the elements of probable consumer harm
have been established.
Both of the business justifications described above could be character-
ized as methods of self-help by which the monopolist attempts to maintain
and appropriate the value of its intellectual property. The consumer benefits
are not immediate, however, as they are when Microsoft integrates a browser
into its operating system. 34 5 Therefore, the comparison between possible
consumer harm and possible consumer benefit is less clear. On the one hand,
if rivals are deterred from innovating because of the possibility of hold-up,
consumers may be injured by virtue of forgone innovation. On the other
hand, if the monopolist's conduct serves to protect the value of its intellectual
property from hold-up, consumers may benefit as a result of increased inno-
vative activity both by the monopolist and any other firm that may find itself
in a similar situation. These cases cannot be resolved by resort to the simple
rule that immediate consumer benefits create a strong presumption of legal-
ity when consumer harm is only a distant possibility. Rather, if the termina-
tion occurs under conditions in which competitive harm is possible, a
conclusion has to be reached based on the relative strength of the competing
stories.
Other long-standing per se rules have been challenged on the grounds
that they inhibit necessary self-help. For example, the per se illegality of ver-
tical territorial restraints was overruled in part because manufacturers have a
legitimate interest in controlling free riding by their distributors,346 conduct
that could in principle be controlled by detailed, legally enforceable contrac-
tual requirements of point-of-sale services. The need to resort to self-help in
defense of legal attacks on intellectual property, however, has no precise
counterpart in tangible property. An infringement claim implies that every
unit of the product sold by the defendant misappropriates the claimant's
property, a condition that is inconceivable when the claimant alleges that the
defendant stole its tangible property. Further, a monopolist may be unaware
that its product allegedly infringes another's intellectual property rights until
a claim is made against it, whereas rights in tangible property are far clearer.
This distinction is important because it is the unpredictability of the infringe-
ment claim that renders the monopolist susceptible to hold-up. Finally, a
monopolist may face claims from multiple intellectual property claimants,
whereas it is fanciful to imagine a monopolist stealing the tangible property
of numerous firms.
The self-help rationale failed in Fashion Originators' Guild of America v.
Federal Trade Commission ("FOGA").347 The Court there condemned a
boycott by dress manufacturers intended to squeeze from the market rivals
that had pirated dress designs that were arguably protected by state tort
law.3 48 The Court characterized Fashion Originators' Guild of America as an
extra-governmental agency,34 9 suggesting only intra-governmental efforts to
345 Supra Part III.
346 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55-56 & n.25 (1977).
347 Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
348 Id. at 461, 468.
349 Id. at 465.
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protect intellectual property were legitimate. But it may be that the per se
condemnation of the boycott in FOGA depended upon the fact that the case
involved an agreement among competitors, which is more likely to result in
an abuse of power than is a vertical agreement.350 A self-help claim is more
likely to provide a justification for unilateral action, particularly in the con-
text of an effort to resolve intellectual property suits.35'
Conclusion
Innovation is essential to economic efficiency in the modem economy.
In recent years, antitrust scholars and the enforcement agencies have sug-
gested that innovation is so important that courts should apply special rules
to limit practices of dominant firms that might inhibit innovation. But in
framing antitrust rules, the importance of protecting innovation from monop-
olistic practices must be weighed against the equivalent danger of deterring
procompetitive conduct. Dominant firms benefit consumers by competing
aggressively and by seeking out the most advantageous outlets and sources of
supply. Any truncated standards of liability raise the danger of unduly re-
stricting the ability of dominant firms to innovate or respond to competitive
challenges. Consequently, we argue that claims of harm to innovation should
meet the same criteria as other claims of monopolization. We would require
any claim of harm to innovation to be justified by credible theory and evi-
dence, particularly when the dominant firm's actions provide immediate ben-
efit to consumers.
350 See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135, 137 (1998) (noting that FOGA
involved an agreement among competitors and that vertical transactions are less competitively
dangerous).
351 But cf. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 603, 605 (1925)
(permitting competitors to exchange information in an effort to protect contractual rights).
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